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KORSGAARD’S CONSTITUTIVISM REFRAMED: 




This dissertation aims to critique and extend upon Christine Korsgaard’s theory of agency. To 
do so, chapter one frames the discussion in terms of her larger constitutivist project, and 
provides definitions and descriptions of key terms in the philosophy of action which prove 
important for the rest of the dissertation. Unlike much of the burgeoning literature engaging 
with Korsgaard’s work that addresses the metanormative ambitions of her argument, the scope 
of the present analysis is her first-order metaphysical account of agency. It is at the first-order 
level, especially with her thesis about the double nature of constitutive norms, that the crucial 
normative step in the argument is made. 
 Chapter two is dedicated to an extensive reconstruction of Korsgaard’s constitutivist 
account. The attention is focused on Korsgaard’s version of the authorship view of agency—
which provides an articulation of what the agent’s psychological structure and organization 
must be in order for an action to be owned, and thus be genuinely her action—, on the 
metaphysics of agency and normativity underpinning Korsgaard’s thesis that self-constitution 
is the function of action, and on her account of responsibility as a practical relation.  
Chapter three explicates some problematic cases for Korsgaard’s view, by considering 
instances of so-called “disorders of agency,” and “socially displaced agency.” Evidence for 
considering these cases as genuine instantiations of agency is presented and discussed, reaching 
the conclusion that Korsgaard’s constitutive norms of agency seem to be neither necessary nor 
sufficient to properly account for them, which points to the need for a clarification of the 
metaphysics of agency and of constitutive normativity. In particular, in light of the Disorders 
scenario, arguments are brought against Korsgaard’s assimilation of the practical normativity 
of agency to moral normativity, and the notion of agential responsibility predicated upon 
Hanna Pickard’s articulation of responsibility without blame is advanced. The analysis of both 
cases, however, corroborates Korsgaard’s relational account of responsibility as answerability, 
on which the dissertation aims to build a reframing and extension of her theory of agency.  
Chapter four sets the stage for the positive contribution of this work by pursuing a 
conceptual elucidation of the notion of constitutive normativity, which is central to 
constitutivism as a first-order theory of agency. Three possible interpretations of Korsgaard’s 
characterization of the notion of constitutive norms are presented and one of them—the 
Practical Interpretation—is endorsed as the best way to make sense of the notion while 
accounting for the conclusions drawn in chapter three. After a close examination of the 
Practical Interpretation, it is argued that the constitutive normativity pertaining to human 
agency is not homogeneous in kind, and the distinction between socially-generated constitutive 
normativity and non-practice-based constitutive normativity is introduced. This work is meant 
to produce a first step in the broader constitutivist project of elucidating how different kinds of 
normativity hold together.  
In chapter five the view of an interactionist approach to agency is laid out, by indicating 
three central components of a first-order constitutivist theory of agency: i) the necessity of a 




Korsgaard’s practical account of responsibility, these aspects get considerably strengthened in 
the relational definition of what it is to be an agent (Agential Responsibility Claim) and the 
proposal of considering agency as inherently socially constituted through interpersonal and 
social practices (Interaction Claim). The reframing of Korsgaard’s account advanced here is 
unique in two respects. First, it suggests incorporating aspects of G. E. M. Anscombe’s seminal 
work on intention—interpreted as an outward-looking and interactional/dialogical approach. 
Second, and congruently, the notion of intersubjective recognition is introduced as a necessary 
component for the characterization of the social constitution of agency.   
After recapitulating the trajectory of the argument, chapter six addresses both the theoretical 
and practical implications of the proposal presented here, as well as some of its limitations and 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
This dissertation will provide a critique of, and an extension upon Christine Korsgaard’s 
constitutivist theory of agency. In this chapter I frame the discussion by introducing some of 
the key notions and projects in philosophy of action and agency (section 1.1), and define the 
origins and aims of constitutivism as a general strategy (section 1.2). I then provide a 
preliminary characterization of Korsgaard’s version of constitutivism, specify and motivate the 
scope of my analysis (section 1.3), and end with an overview of the path ahead (section 1.4).  
  
1.1  Agency, Agents, and Action Theory 
The rising and flourishing of the philosophy of action over the past sixty years has crucially 
revolved around conceptual, metaphysical, and epistemological questions about the nature of 
action and its explanation.1 Roughly speaking, an agent is a creature capable of acting, and 
agency is the capacity exercised by the agent when she does something.  
 
1.1.1 The Standard Conception and the Traditional View of Agency and Action 
Different conceptions and different theories of action and agency have been developed,2 but 
the ‘standard conception’ of action underlying debates in philosophy of action has intentional 
action at its core. The standard conception consists of two central claims: (1) the notion of 
action is to be explained in terms of intentional action, and (2) there is a close relation between 
acting intentionally and acting for a reason. Consequently, the standard conception 
characterizes agency as the capacity to act intentionally and for reasons, and someone counts 
as an agent if she manifests that capacity.  
While there is consensus on the standard conception,3 different theories of action and agency 
may result from it, depending on the account of intentional action and reason explanation 
endorsed. The ‘traditional view’ (also referred to as the ‘standard view’) of action and agency 
                                                
 
1 See Aguilar, Buckareff & Frankish (2011) for the distinction between philosophy of action as a narrow and 
a broad sub-discipline of philosophy.  
2 I rely on Schlosser (2015) for this distinction between ‘conceptions’ and ‘theories’ of agency.  
3 Alternative conceptions differ in that they emphasize agency as ‘a power to initiate’ irreducible to the 
capacity to act intentionally and for reasons. For a list of the proponents of such alternative (e.g., C. Ginet, 




in contemporary debates is an event-causal theory of intentional action and reason explanation. 
According to the traditional view, an action is intentional and done for reasons just in case it is 
caused by the right mental states and events (the agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions) in the 
right way—that is, by rationalizing the action from the agent’s point of view.4 The main 
theoretical concern guiding the traditional view is that of providing an account of human 
agency and action which emphasizes a relation of continuity between ‘agential phenomena’ on 
the one hand, and natural events and the (scientific) explanation thereof, on the other. 
Although widespread, the traditional view has been largely criticized for failing to capture 
the distinctiveness of human agency. In the event-causal picture, the criticism goes, the agent 
‘disappears,’ in that she seems to serve just as a ‘passive arena’ for the mental states and events 
that cause her behavior.5 The agent is therefore reduced to “the causal roles of agent-involving 
states and events.” (Schlosser, 2015, 3.1. Cf. also Velleman, 1992/2000, p. 125) 6 As a result, 
the traditional view loses grip on the understanding of ordinary practices of responsibility 
attribution, and on the basic idea that actions are ‘up to’ their agents. Genuine actions—
detractors of the traditional view contend—differ from mere behavior and other events that 
happen to occur to the agent precisely because of the role played by the agent in bringing them 
about. 
 
1.1.2 Non-Reductive Theories of Agency and Action 
Accordingly, the task for non-reductive theories of agency and action (be they compatible with 
a causal framework or not)7 is that of spelling out an account of the relevant functional 
organization of the agent’s psychological structure in virtue of which intentional agency8 is a 
form of conscious, self-directed, and guided activity. In other words, non-reductive theories 
aim at providing a personal level (vs. an event-causal) analysis of agency. This kind of analysis 
                                                
 
4 The leading proponent of the traditional view is Donald Davidson.  
5 For this criticism, known in the literature as the problem of the ‘disappearance of the agent,’ see Velleman 
(1992/2000), Ferrero (2009a), Steward (2012). The same contrast emerges also from Korsgaard’s 
characterization of what being an agent amounts to: “I am not the mere location of a causally effective desire 
but rather am the agent who acts on the desire,” SN (p. 228).   
6 Schlosser (2015, section 3.1). Cf. Velleman, (1992/2000, p. 125). 
7 Among non-reductive accounts of agency there are agent-causal approaches, and volitionist approaches. 
For an overview see Schlosser (2015, section 3.1). 
8 Unless otherwise specified, throughout the discussion I will be using the unqualified term action for 




involves accounting not just for the distinctive psychological dimension of human agency (e.g., 
its first-personal phenomenology—the fact that agency comes with a characteristic sense of 
ownership; the nature of motivation), but also for its normative character. This amounts to 
investigating agential notions (choice, autonomy, reason-responsiveness, responsibility, to 
name a few), and the practices and contexts within which these notions find application, by 
focusing on the ‘manifest image’—that is, the conceptual framework in terms of which human 
beings conceive of themselves as agent.  
An alternate way to delineate the distinction between the traditional (causally reductionist) 
view and non-reductive theories of agency and action, is to observe that (at least some) non-
reductive theories conceive of the philosophy of action and agency as part of practical 
philosophy, broadly understood to encompass ethical theory, moral psychology, philosophy of 
practical rationality, and theories of normativity.  
Within these more expansive non-reductive theories, so-called ‘dual standpoint theories’ 
have emerged as leading contenders in the philosophy of action.9 According to these theories, 
“agency can only be understood from a practical and normative standpoint.”10 While in 
principle compatible with a broadly naturalistic metaphysical framework, the present work 
explores therefore a non-traditional theory of action and agency, in the sense that the 
understanding of intentional action and reason explanation endorsed here is distinct from the 
causal one provided by the traditional view.  
The spirit that informs the present work sides with the practical construal of the action-
theoretical landscape.11 This dissertation is an attempt to provide an elucidation of the practical 
normativity proper to agency through the examination of one prominent example of a dual 
standpoint theory: Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivist account of agency—which embraces 
both a non-reductive view, and the ethical (or broadly normative) implications of such a view.  
Generally speaking, constitutivist arguments are such that “they promise to explain the 
normative force of certain rational requirements in a broadly naturalistic way, without helping 
themselves to irreducible normative properties external to the agent” (Tubert, 2011, p. 344, 
                                                
 
9 The traditional partitioning is into event-causal, agent-causal, and volitionist approaches to agency; see 
Schlosser (2015, section 3.3).  
10 Ibid. According to Schlosser dual standpoint theorist are T. Nagel, C. Korsgaard, and A. Bilgrami. I would 
also add Moran (2001, 2004, 2012), and Bagnoli (2007, 2012).   
11 Under this respect, my way of conceiving of action theory is akin to Aguilar et al.’s (2011, pp. 1-2) 





italics is mine). Especially in her most recent work on constitutivism, Korsgaard provides a 
unique account of the metaphysics of agency and normativity. But before getting there, an 




Constitutivism is a philosophical position according to which certain normative claims of 
practical reason and morality—that is, about which actions an agent has reason (or ought) to 
pursue/perform—can be derived from the features that are essential to being a rational agent:12 
a creature capable of acting on the basis of reasons. Here are a few definitions: 
A constitutive theory is a metanormative theory that purports to establish the 
objective validity and content of practical norms on the basis of the 
constitutive features of agency. (Ferrero, 2015, p. 883) 
Constitutive arguments attempt to establish the normativity of rational 
requirements by pointing out that we are already committed to them insofar 
as we are believers or agents […] to justify requirements anyone would have 
reason to accept [normative requirements] by explaining what it is to engage 
in a certain activity or be a certain kind of being. (Tubert, 2010, pp. 656-657) 
The insight, in a nutshell, is to ground content and authority of non-
hypothetical practical standards in features viewed as distinctive to either 
agency or action. (Bertea, 2013, p. 81) 
The above definitions are an expression of the prevailing line of interpretation of the 
constitutivist project informing current debates on constitutivism, which emphasizes the 
distinctively metanormative character of the project. In other words, constitutivism aims to 
show that the normativity of requirements of practical reason—namely their objectivity (non-
contingency and universality), and practicality (action-guiding character and authority)—is 
grounded in principles proper to intentional human agency. The constitutivist project, however, 
originates from somewhat separate debates and theoretical concerns. 
 
                                                
 
12 Unless otherwise specified, my use of the term ‘agent’ stands for ‘rational agent,’ as opposed, for example, 
to non-human, animal agents. In other words, the discussion ranges within the scope of the standard 




1.2.1 Constitutivism and Metaethical Constructivism 
On the one hand, within moral and metaethical debates, constitutivism should be interpreted as 
a metanormative project akin to certain versions of constructivism.13 Metaethical 
constructivism represents a distinctive alternative to realist and anti-realist approaches to 
questions about the existence and nature of normative truths, and can be said to be advancing 
both a metaphysical and a normative thesis. The metaphysical thesis consists in a positive reply 
to the question about the existence of normative truths, and holds that “these truths are not 
fixed by facts that are independent of the practical standpoint, […] rather, they are constituted 
by what agents would agree to under specified conditions of choice” (Bagnoli, 2011/2015, 
preamble). As a first-order (moral) normative theory, constructivism holds that the normative 
principles we ought to accept/follow “are the ones that agents would endorse were they to 
engage in a hypothetical or idealized process of rational deliberation” (ibid)—call this the 
normative thesis. In other words, the human capacities for self-reflection, evaluation, practical 
reasoning, are the legitimate and authoritative processes to appeal to in our quest for normative 
validation and guidance.  
The distinctiveness of constructivism qua metaethical position lies therefore in a vindication 
of the objectivity of normative judgments via the appeal to the self-authenticating character of 
the evaluative procedure through which these judgements are arrived at, or constructed. The 
relation between constitutivism and certain varieties of constructivism consists therefore in the 
appeal, on the part of the latter, to constitutive norms of reasoning/evaluation/agency (ibid, 
section 7.3). 
Emphasizing the tight connection between constitutivism and constructivism, however, 
should not lead to underestimate the fact that they do not necessarily overlap. First of all, 
constructivism extends beyond the metaethical debate and as a matter of fact it originally came 
out as a position in political philosophy. Second, there are various accounts of constructivism 
and constitutivism, and—as it has been noticed14—certain versions of the latter might not be 
compatible with some versions of the former. In particular, the constitutivist strategy as we can 
find it articulated in recent debates is not part of early constructivist theories, notably the one 
                                                
 
13 Here I refer here mainly to Kantian constructivism. For an exhaustive reconstruction and mapping of 
constructivism in metaethics see Bagnoli (2011/2015). See also Hanisch & Baiasu (2016), for a 
characterization of constitutivism that brings to the fore its relation with metaethical constructivism.  
14 Baiasu (2016, n. 1). While this is the case for A Theory of Justice, it is less straightforward with respect to 




exemplified by Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, which is a form of political constructivism, more 
modest than ethical constructivism (ibid, section 1). 
 
1.2.2 Constitutivist Strategies and Action Theory 
On the other hand, constitutivism arguably represents one among many recent philosophical 
approaches which take action theory to have an explanatory priority over theories of practical 
reasoning.15 In particular, such approaches focus on establishing what it takes for something to 
be an action, and in delineating a distinction between full-fledged action and “mere activity” 
or “mere behavior.” With these distinctions in place, they make a case for the claim that in 
order for something to be an action at all, reasons for action must have a certain logical form. 
As a project in philosophy of action distinct from strictly metaethical and metanormative 
concerns, we can thus say that constitutivism has, first and foremost, a distinctive metaphysical 
ambition in that it provides an account of what intentional human agency is, and what its 
essential, or constitutive features are.  
The crucial step in the overall constitutivist strategy, however, is made at the very level of 
the first-order account of what, metaphysically, human agency is.  It is here that the essentially 
normative character of constitutivist strategies comes into play16—that is, with the claim that 
it is the nature of human agency itself that determines the standards for good or successful 
agency. In light of the distinctive metaphysical position advanced, I will therefore refer to, and 
focus on, constitutivism as a kind of metaphysical-cum-normative strategy in action theory.  
To be sure, there are differences in the scope and strength of the conclusions of extant 
variants of constitutivism.17 Christine M. Korsgaard’s Kantian account, for example, identifies 
the constitutive standards of agency with moral principles—the hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives—qualifying it as a strong form of constitutivism. David Velleman, on the other 
hand, maintains that moral norms are supported by, but not categorically rationally required 
                                                
 
15 I refer here to Millgram’s (2005/2012) way of framing the relation between recent developments in 
theories of practical reasoning and action theory, and to his characterization of the action-theoretical turn in 
theories of practical reasoning.  
16 See Enoch (2006) for the distinction between the normative and the metanormative aspects of 
constitutivism. 
17 As a matter of fact, a plethora of variants can be distinguished within the constitutivist project—i.e., 
Kantian (Korgaard, 1996a, 2008, 2009, Engstrom, 2009), Humean (Velleman, 2000, 2009), Aristotelian 




by, the constitutive aim of action, situating it as a more flexible account (Velleman, 2009).18 
Both, however, define agency in terms of a functional kind by claiming that action has a 
constitutive function, or aim, and both track down the nature and sources of ethical normativity 
by looking to the constitutive function of action. The very idea of a constitutive aim or function 
of action, in fact, carries normative consequences, since it sets standards of success with respect 
to the fulfillment of the aim/function itself. 
The capacity to act for reasons at the core of the standard conception of agency is crucial for 
all the varieties of constitutivism on offer. For example, Korsgaard and Velleman share a 
similar approach to understanding where agency lies—that is, in the exercise of our distinctive 
agential capacities—even though they develop independent views of what these distinctive 
capacities are (the capacity for self-constitution, according to Korsgaard, and for self-
understanding, to Velleman).  
Despite their differences, all varieties of the constitutivist strategy can be said to display the 
following structural features: They provide (i) an account/theory of human action—i.e., 
propounding certain features as the constitutive aim/standards/principles of action—which, in 
conjunction with (ii) the claim about the inescapability of acting, is aimed at (iii) vindicating 
the normative authority of normative claims of practical reason from the theory of 
action/agency endorsed.19  
Unlike most of the extant literature on constitutivism (Enoch, 2006, 2011, Ferrero, 2009b, 
Millgram, 2011, Bertea, 2013, Arruda, 2016a), in the present work I will not engage in an 
evaluation of the prospects of constitutivism as a metanormative strategy (step (iii) of the 
argument). Rather, my focus will be on how constitutive norms work in the elaboration of a 
theory of agency and action, and, most importantly, on clarifying the status of the practical 
normativity pertaining to agency, as opposed to moral normativity. This focus will be discussed 
using Christine Korsgaard’s theory, according to which the normativity of rational agency and 
of morality are one and the same, and falling short of morality implies falling short of agency 
altogether, and vice versa.  
                                                
 
18 See Arruda (2016a) for a clear discussion of the distinction between Korsgaard’s “Robustly Normatively 
Oriented” and Velleman’s “Weakly Normatively Oriented” varieties of constitutivism. 
19 Cf. Katsafanas, forthcoming, and the special issue on constitutivism and Kantian constructivism of 
Philosophia (2016) for a similar characterization of the argumentative strategy common to the different 
varieties of constitutivism on offer. According to this characterization, constitutivist arguments might 
endorse a traditional, causal, view of action (e.g., Velleman) or not (e.g., Korsgaard). As stated in the 





1.3 Korsgaard’s Constitutivism 
The scope of my analysis in the present work is restricted to Korsgaard’s theory of agency, 
which is arguably the most prominent and developed, as well as the most contentious, version 
of constitutivism on offer. Korsgaard’s constitutivist argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
(1) Human beings must act 
(2) In order to act, human beings must unify themselves into agents 
(3) Human beings can only be unified into agents when they cohere with the 
principles of practical rationality 
(C) So, human beings as unified agents must act in accordance with the 
principles of practical rationality 
The premises of the argument relate to the “inescapability” condition on the one hand 
(premise 1), and to Korsgaard’s account of what, metaphysically, intentional human agency is, 
and what its essential, or constitutive features are, on the other (premise 2 and 3). As mentioned 
in the previous section, the core of the constitutivist strategy lies at the level of first-order 
metaphysical-cum-normative account of agency. This, accordingly, will be the level of concern 
of my analysis throughout this dissertation. 
Among the reasons for focusing on the first-order account rather than on the metanormative 
strategy is the fact that, as it has been pointed out (Katsafanas, 2013, chapters 3-4, Katsafanas, 
forthcoming), a preliminary clarification of the first-order characterization of agency will prove 
to be crucial to the viability of the metanormative ambitions of the constitutivist project itself.  
The main reason for addressing Korsgaard’s account is that it provides an explicit 
articulation of the notion of constitutive norms. Constitutive norms are not just principles 
regulating a pre-existing activity—they constitute, or define, while at the same time providing 
guidance for, the very activity one is engaged in by conforming to them. This is Korsgaard’s 
claim about the double nature of constitutive standards: 
They are normative, because in performing the activities of which they are 
the principles, we are guided by them, and yet we can fail to conform to them. 
But they are also descriptive, because they describe the activities we perform 
when we are guided by them. (CA, p. 9) 
Korsgaard’s account of agency has been accused of conflating the concept of action with 
that of a good action, and of not being compatible with the intuitive claim that in order for 




forthcoming, sections 5.1 and 5.5, and Lavin, 2004, respectively). If these criticisms are 
correct, then on Korsgaard’s account any action must be a good action, and any defective action 
entails a denial of agency. This raises a number of issues for the messy, actual world within 
which we ordinarily act, and is especially problematic because the double nature of constitutive 
norms seems to involve a commitment to provide an account which is both normative and 
descriptive. In the real world, instances of ‘defective’ and ‘bad’ actions and agents abound, 
thereby making Korsgaard’s construal of the double nature thesis problematic in the face of the 
“error constraint” to which agency intuitively must be subject.  
This dissertation addresses the challenge from defective actions by analyzing two varieties 
of alleged breakdowns of agency: cases of 1) disorders of agency and 2) socially displaced 
agency. The interpretations of the cases that I rely on and endorse, make a strong case for 
considering them as instances of genuine agency, thereby calling for a clarification of the 
notion of constitutive normativity relevant to agency.  
Overall, my aim in this work is to point to and resolve some of the tensions within 
Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory, by advancing an expansion which strengthens its most 
valuable insights.  
 
1.4 Plan of the Work 
In light of the articulation of the state of the art in philosophy of action provided in the first 
section of this chapter, the specificity and merit of Korsgaard’s account lies in its attempt at an 
elucidation of the special perspective we occupy, qua agents, with regard to our intentional 
actions, as well as the authoritative character peculiar to the agential standpoint. Accordingly, 
Korsgaard’s theory provides an especially articulated version of the so-called ‘authorship 
views’ of agency. These belong to a specific strand in action theory that identifies the 
distinguishing feature of human actions in their being authored—as opposed, for example, to 
action’s stepwise structure, its evaluative character, or its essentially being part of a practice 
(“calculative,” “evaluation,” and “practice” views, respectively) (Millgram, 2005/2012).20 
Authorship views provide an account of what the agent’s psychological structure and 
organization must be in order for her actions to be owned.  
                                                
 
20 Whether these different approaches count as forms constitutivism themselves and, if so, how do they relate 





In the next chapter I provide a close reconstruction of Korsgaard’s authorship view, her 
relational conception of responsibility, and her constitutivist theory, by paying special attention 
to spelling out the distinctive metaphysics of agency and normativity underlying them.  
In chapter three I present two case studies exemplifying the problem of defective actions and 
agency. The discussion of these cases brings to the fore the importance of accounting for the 
agential perspective as connected with the context of interpersonal and social practices within 
which agency is exercised, and illuminates a tension in Korsgaard’s account—the metaphysical 
turn taken by her constitutivist theory of agency seems to be at odds with the practical character 
of the overarching constructivist enterprise she takes herself to be engaged in. I provide a 
critique of Korsgaard’s assimilation of the notion of responsibility to moral responsibility, and 
propose some adjustments to her account that are meant to emphasize the practical (vs. 
metaphysical) character of her approach in non-moral terms. 
Chapter four zeroes in on Korsgaard’s characterization of constitutive norms by providing 
three possible interpretations of the notion, and favoring one of them as the best way to make 
sense of the conclusions drawn from the discussion of the case studies. I pursue an elucidation 
of the constitutive normativity pertaining to agency by distinguishing between practice-based, 
or socially-generated, and non-practice-based constitutive normativity. 
In chapter five I string together the claims I advanced throughout the critical part of the 
dissertation, and outline my proposal of expansion upon Korsgaard’s account towards a 
constitutivist-interactionist view of agency.  
Chapter six concludes the dissertation by recapping the argument and the proposal it led to, 
identifying its theoretical and practical implications, and discussing some of its limitations and 





Chapter Two – Korsgaard’s Constitutivist Account of Agency 
 
In this chapter I provide a reconstruction of Korsgaard’s version of constitutivism, with the aim 
of showing how the notions of rational reflection, choice, authorship, personal identity, self-
constitution, and responsibility coalesce into her proposed normative theory of agency.  
 
2.1 The Distinctive Character of Human Agency 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the capacity to act intentionally and for reasons is at 
the core of all the varieties of constitutivism on offer. For Korsgaard, in particular, human 
agency is rational agency. She defines the faculty of reason in Kantian terms as “the active 
aspect of the mind,” that is, a faculty or power that stems from the specific kind of self-
consciousness proper to human agents. This specific type of self-consciousness is “the source 
of a psychic complexity not experienced by the other animals,” one that “transforms psychic 
unity from a natural state into something that has to be achieved, into a task and an activity” 
(SC, section 6.4.1, emphasis is mine). In her words:  
[…] we human beings are aware, not only that we perceive or desire or fear 
certain things, but also that we are inclined to believe and to act in certain 
ways on the basis of these perceptions or desires or fears. We are aware not 
only of our representations and desires as such but also of the way in which 
they tend to operate on us. That is what I mean by saying that we are aware 
of the potential grounds of our beliefs and actions as potential grounds. And 
this awareness is the source of Reason. For once we are aware that we are 
inclined to believe on the ground of a certain perception, or to act on the 
ground of a certain desire, we find ourselves faced with a decision, namely, 
whether we should do that—whether we should draw the conclusion, or 
perform the action, on the ground in question, or not. Once the space of 
awareness—of reflective distance, as I like to call it—opens up between the 
potential ground of an action and the action itself, we must step across that 
distance with some awareness that we are doing so, and so must be able to 
endorse the operation of that ground as the basis for what we believe or do. 
And a ground of belief or action whose operation on us as a ground is one 
that we can endorse is a reason. This means that the space of reflective 
distance presents us with both the possibility and the necessity of exerting a 
kind of control over our beliefs and actions that the other animals probably 
do not have. We are active, self-directing, with respect to our beliefs and 




both can have, and absolutely require, reasons to believe and act as we do. 
(CA, pp. 4-5. See also SN, section 3.2.1) 
It is within the space of reflective distance that the question whether our 
incentives give us reasons arises. In order to answer that question, we need 
principles, which determine what we are to count as reasons. Our rational 
principles then replace our instincts—they will tell us what is an appropriate 
response to what, what makes what worth doing, what the situation calls for. 
(SC, section 6.1.7) 
According to Korsgaard, action is “one among several forms of ‘rational activity’,” and 
“acting in the sense relevant to practical reason is that activity that is directed to producing 
some state of affairs in the world” (CA, p. 10). Thanks to the reflective structure of self-
consciousness, however, the relation between an agent and her action is not one of mere 
production, but rather of authoring. Korsgaard’s theory is a version of the so-called authorship 
views: the distinguishing or essential feature of human action is that it is attributable to the 
person who performs it, to its author—an action is “a movement that is attributable to an agent 
as its author” (SC, p. xi). 
The “special form of attribution” that is at stake when identifying someone’s actions21 is 
meant to capture not just the efficacious role of the agent’s relevant mental states in causing 
her movements, but the fact that she is “plac[ing] [her]self fully behind the movement [she is] 
about to make or the change [she is] about to effect, to endorse it wholeheartedly” (NCA, 
section 1.1). We are entitled to attribute an action to an agent, Korsgaard continues, when the 
agent has contributed to it in a specific way. In other words, what distinguishes someone’s 
actions from mere movements or less-than-full-fledged intentional actions, is that the actions 
are owned by the person, that they are attributable to their author as a whole, rather than to 
some desire or other forces working within her. The criteria for whole-person attribution, in 
turn, rely on the person’s psychic regulation and organization, which requires rational agents 
to play an active role in regulating. 
The scope of authorship, in Korsgaard’s Kantian view, is the scope of rational agency, both 
in its practical and doxastic aspect (see also Moran, 2001).  And where rational agency is, there 
is also a distinctive kind of responsibility, which stands for the practical relation between an 
                                                
 
21 The use of the term ‘action’ here stands for intentional action. I will say more on the distinctions proper 




agent and her own mental states, attitudes, and actions, as she engages in the rational activity 
of determining what to believe and what to do. 
 
2.2 Practical Identity and the Psychology of Action 
The kind of psychic complexity stemming from human, rational self-consciousness, Korsgaard 
claims, makes it necessary to achieve an agential unity, in virtue of which it is possible to 
attribute the action to the agent as a whole, as its author. In order to act, the agent must unify 
herself by adopting a principle of choice, which enables her to endorse a certain inclination of 
hers as a reason, and to act upon it. The principle of choice confers a normative status on the 
relevant incentive, and by acting according to that principle, by identifying herself with that 
principle, the agent acts in such a way that her actions are expressive of herself (see SN, section 
3.3.1, SC, sections 6.1.7-6.2.5). 
When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of 
your desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire to act 
on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions 
is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. (SN, p. 100) 
The necessity of, and capacity for, normative self-government proper to human agents brings 
with it a “distinct form of identity, a norm-governed or practical form of identity, for which we 
are ourselves responsible” (SC, p. xii): as human beings, 
we are each faced with the task of constructing a peculiar, individual kind of 
identity—personal or practical identity—that the other animals lack. It is this 
sort of identity that makes sense of our practice of holding people 
responsible, and of the kinds of personal relationships that depend on that 
practice.  […]  It is as the possessor of personal or practical identity that you 
are the author of your actions, and responsible for them. And yet at the same 
time it is in choosing your actions that you create that identity. What this 
means is that you constitute yourself as the author of your actions in the very 
act of choosing them. (SC, section 1.4.3) 
 
It is therefore in virtue of expressing someone’s reflected-upon commitments and values—
that is, a practical identity—that actions are attributable to their author as a whole, while at the 
same time constituting her as an agent. The notion of practical identity is central to Korsgaard’s 
project. A practical identity is “a description under which you value yourself and find your life 




3.3.1). Practical identities represent thus both sources of reasons for us, in that they provide the 
incentives and principles to govern the choice of our actions, and the output of our actions, 
when these are properly undertaken. 
As concrete, embodied agents, we have many practical identities, corresponding to the 
contingent roles and relationships we hold within the network of our interpersonal 
relationships. However, while we acquire or drop different identities in the course of our lives 
through deliberation and reflection, we cannot drop out of the practical necessity of choosing 
and acting itself. As rational beings, reflection and choice are “the simple, inexorable fact of 
the human condition,” “our plight:” 
We must act, and we need reasons in order to act. And unless there are some 
principles with which we identify we will have no reasons to act. Every 
human being must make [her]self into someone in particular, in order to have 
reasons to act and to live. Carving out a personal identity for which we are 
responsible is one of the inescapable tasks of human life. […] 
We owe it to ourselves, to our own humanity, to find some roles that we can 
fill with integrity and dedication. But in acknowledging that, we commit 
ourselves to the value of our humanity just as such. (SC, section 1.4.7) 22 
Being an agent amounts then to be engaged in the task of unifying oneself into a coherent 
whole by choosing and acting on reasons, by taking responsibility for one’s own practical 
identity, and thereby becoming, a specific individual. By providing the specific content on 
which the formal principle of agency—of self-determined, autonomous efficacy—is imposed 
(see SC, sections 1.4.7, 2.4.2, and NCA, section 1.3), contingent practical identities determine 
a functioning self. An action, on the other hand, is authored and attributable to her agent if and 
only if it is autonomous—i.e., if it is the expression of the process of self-reflection and 
deliberation.  
 
2.3 From the Ordinary Concept of Agency to the Normative Conception of 
Agency 
Korsgaard’s characterization of agency in terms of authorship is motivated by what she takes 
to be two features proper to our ordinary concept of agency: 
                                                
 
22 On the contingency of our practical identities and on the difference between actively embracing it or 




[i] when we attribute an action to a person, we are suggesting that [s]he has 
been active, and [ii] when we respond to someone’s actions, we take 
ourselves to be responding to h[er], to features of h[er] identity. I am going 
to call those two features of our ordinary concept of agency the activity 
implication [i] and the identity implication [ii]. (NCA, section 1.2) 
According to Korsgaard, there is a primarily metaphysical aspect to the activity implication, 
that is the idea that “an agent’s activity is supposed to be implicated in her agency. The activity 
implication is meant to capture the intuition that in attributing an action we assume a special 
kind of relation between it and the person who performed it. Intentional actions are owned, or 
authored, by the agent as a result of a certain activity on her part. This basically amounts to the 
intuition that overt agency is the ongoing manifestation and exercise of the ability of self-
movement and of producing a change, which are initiated and controlled by the agent herself 
on the basis of rational reflection. The metaphysical aspect of the activity implication, 
Korsgaard adds, carries therefore an additional, distinctively normative implication, namely 
the fact that “an agent, just as such, is the kind of thing that can succeed or fail,” which “seems 
to imply that [she is] under some kind of norm or principle which [she] may live up to or not” 
(ivi, section 1.3). These norms, the principles governing agency are, according to her, the 
principles of practical reason.  
The identity implication, on the other hand, has a distinctively normative import in that 
to say that someone did something is to mention what is, in general, a proper 
ground for responses to her that are normative or at least personal. 
Characteristically, we hold adult human beings responsible for their actions; 
more generally, we take people’s actions to be legitimate or at least 
appropriate grounds for responses like love and hate, liking and disliking, 
gratitude and resentment. In all of these ways, we take a person’s actions to 
reflect something really essential about her, to represent her in some way. As 
I will put it, a person’s identity, her essential self, seems to be evinced in 
some special way in her actions, so that when we respond to her actions, we 
are responding to her. (Ibid) 
The activity and the identity implications carried by the ordinary attributions of agency are, 
according to Korsgaard, difficult to explain “on a purely naturalistic conception” of agency. 
By such a naturalistic conception Korsgaard means a view according to which the sense in 
which an agent is active is when her own mental states or representations play a causal role in 
initiating and guiding her movements. The endorsement of a normative conception such as her 




the two implications “from the first-person point of view”—that is, to secure the distinctive 
character of the first-person perspective on action, or agential perspective. This is the 
perspective occupied by an agent that, in order to act, needs reasons to settle the issue about 
what she ought to do. In other words, the first-personal, agential point of view is an irreducibly 
practical, or normative, standpoint; it is the stance of self-reflection and autonomous 
deliberation from which a rational being comes to act as a unified, coherent whole. 
By drawing on Plato’s analogy between the human soul and the constitution of the polis on 
the one hand, and on the tradition of modern political philosophy, which regards the political 
state as a kind of agent (notably, Rousseau), on the other, Korsgaard proposes a “constitutional 
model” of agency. The idea is that of conceiving of individual agency as bearing an inherent 
symmetry with the way in which a political state comes to act as a single entity by unifying its 
parts under a “general will”—that is, by acting in accordance with its constitution (SC, ch. 7).  
According to these views, the capacity to act as a single unified agent consists in “the 
establishment of normative relationships among the people who make it up, in particular their 
relationships of authority and mutual obligation,” on the one hand, and in the “success in 
actually performing an action, in doing something that counts as an action,” which “depends 
on conformity to the norms in question” (NCA, section 1.1), on the other. 
Korsgaard’s proposal is thus that in the case of individual agency, the relevant normative 
relations are those through which the person achieves the psychic unity necessary to act, and 
by so doing, constituting her agency. It is in the very act of choosing her action, Korsgaard 
claims, that an agent constitutes herself as its author. As a result of the processes of practical 
reflection and deliberation she actively engages in, the agent authorizes those actions as her 
own, she authors them, and comes to a position of authority over her own intentional actions. 
It is by acting according to the principles of practical reason that the agent comes to normatively 
relate to herself.   
 
2.4 Responsibility 
The activity and the identity implications correspond to the first-personal, agential perspective, 
and the second- and third-personal perspectives on agency, respectively. The linchpin between 
these two aspects of agency, Korsgaard explains, is the concept of responsibility (AKC, section 
3.1, p. 33). Following Strawson, Korsgaard understands responsibility in terms of a practical 




taken rather than something assigned” (Korsgaard, 1992/1996b, p. 189).23 Accordingly, 
holding someone responsible means to treat her as a person responsive to reasons and capable 
of acting on them, and to expect to be treated by her in the same way. Holding someone 
responsible, Korsgaard claims, amounts to entertaining a relation of reciprocity with her, 
acknowledging and being prepared to equal demands for justification of one’s actions, 
attitudes, and goals. Responsibility is then, in a fundamental sense, the relation of mutual 
reciprocity we enter by participating in the normative practice of asking for, and giving, 
reasons.  
Ask yourself, what is a reason? It is not just a consideration on which you in 
fact act, but one in which you are supposed to act; it is not just a motive, but 
rather a normative claim, exerting authority over other people and yourself 
at other times. To say that you have a reason is to say something relational, 
something which implies the existence of another, at least another self. It 
announces that you have a claim on another, or acknowledges her claim on 
you. For normative claims are not the claims of a metaphysical world of 
values upon us: they are claims we make on ourselves and each other. 
(Korsgaard, 1993/1996b, p. 301) 
Throughout her production, Korsgaard has developed an account of responsibility as 
answerability based on argument from the publicity of reasons. “The possibility of personal 
interaction,” the argument goes, “depends on the possibility of shared deliberation,” which “in 
turn depends on a certain conception of reasons. Our reasons must be […] public reasons, 
reasons whose normative force can extend across the boundaries between people” (SC, section 
9.4.5). According to the Kantian constructivist conception of reasons Korsgaard endorses, 
public reasons are “things that emerge in the interaction between people,” and are thus 
essentially intersubjective (ibid).24 
                                                
 
23 Watson (1996) articulates the distinction between ‘two faces of responsibility’ (i.e., attributability and 
accountability): Strawson-inspired accounts (accountability views) regard responsibility as a matter of 
interpersonal relations—i.e., the agent is held accountable within a network of social and interpersonal 
relationships—whereas according to attributability views an agent responsible just in case her action 
‘disclose’ her commitments and evaluative judgments.  
24 Korsgaard’s proposal bears some similarities with other Strawsonian relational approaches to moral 
responsibility—notably, Stephen Darwall’s. Unlike Darwall, however, Korsgaard does not embrace a 
thorough second-personal approach, as she anchors the starting point for morality in the deliberative 
standpoint of the individual agent (on Darwall, cf. Lavin (2008)). R. J. Wallace develops a “normativist” 
account of moral responsibility, i.e., conditions for being responsible amount to norms for appropriately 





To sum up, the normative conception of agency is one that accounts for the special kind of 
authority of the agential perspective, which carries responsibilities and privileges both to 
ourselves and others. By acting on (essentially shareable) reasons, one establishes a relation of 
authority over herself, making herself accountable to herself and others, and thereby constitutes 
herself as an agent according to the principles of practical reason. 
 
2.5 The Metaphysics (and Epistemology) of Agency and Normativity 
Korsgaard crucially characterizes agency and responsibility in practical terms, thereby 
opposing her own view to those taking a ‘metaphysical route’ to defining these concepts.25 
However, her most recent work importantly aims at making sense of both the metaphysical and 
normative aspects involved in the ordinary concept of agency (the activity and identity 
implications). To this end, a cornerstone of her proposal is the characterization of agency in 
terms of an activity—the activity of self-constitution. And it is in order to clarify the distinctive 
metaphysics of agency and of the practical normativity proper to it26 that Korsgaard introduces 
the notion of constitutive norms, or normative principles. The reconstruction that follows will 
illustrate both issues, in turn. 
 
2.5.1 Agency as the Activity of Self-Constitution 
First and foremost, the conception of normativity endorsed by Korsgaard is one that she 
believes to be shared by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, according to which “normative principles 
are in general principles of the unification of manifolds, multiplicities, or […] mere heaps, into 
objects of particular kinds” (SC, section 2.1.1). More specifically, Korsgaard appeals to 
                                                
 
25 I borrow the distinction between ‘metaphysical’ and ‘practical’ routes to responsibility from Zheng (2016), 
who takes it to correspond to the responsibility-as-attributability vs. responsibility-as-accountability 
distinction. See also Wolf (1990, pp. 16-17) for the distinction between the ‘metaphysical’ and the 
‘pragmatic’ approach to responsibility and free will. I agree with Zheng in considering Korsgaard’s most 
recent work as an example of the metaphysical route to responsibility, rather than the practical one. This 
interpretation is in contrast with Korsgaard’s own way of conceiving of her account of responsibility in 
earlier works, where she takes sides with Strawson in emphasizing the relational/interpersonal aspect of the 
notion of responsibility (cf. previous section). For the sake of a clearer reconstruction of Korsgaard’s position 
here, I postpone the articulation of my suggestion that the ‘Korsgaardian constitutivism’ go back on the 
‘practical’ route to the next chapters. 
26 Chapter 2 of SC is entirely devoted to “The Metaphysics of Normativity.” However, the appeal to the idea 
of “constitutive norms” is far from being exclusive to the most recent work, as we can find it at least as early 
as in SN, as well as in Korsgaard (1999/2008). See Bagnoli (2009) for a discussion of the transition from 
Korsgaard’s early constructivist proposal to her late appeal to constitutivism, which “amounts to importing 




Aristotle’s extension of his account of artifactual identity to the characterization of a living 
thing in terms of a self-maintaining form—that is, “a functionally related set of powers” 
engaged into self-constituting processes. The specific difference of human agency—in relation 
to agency as a genus encompassing self-determined kind of efficacy—consists in the capacity 
of being motivated and guided by reason.  
As we have seen, for Korsgaard being an agent means to be faced with, and being engaged 
in, the task of acting and choosing—and it is by acting on the basis of reasons that a person 
comes to constitute herself into an agent, bringing about the kind of unity that makes it possible 
to ascribe actions to her as their author. In an important sense, then, there is no agent prior to 
her choosing and acting—action is therefore self-constitution (ivi, section 1.4.8), and agency 
is the activity of self-constitution. Korsgaard anticipates the objection that his characterization 
of agency seems to lead to a paradox, the paradox of self-constitution: “How can you constitute 
yourself, create yourself, unless you are already there?” (ivi, 1.4.3). The paradox, however, 
stems from erroneously conceiving of self-constitution as “a state that we achieve and from 
which action then issues.” On the contrary, Korsgaard insists, self-constitution should be 
conceptualized in terms of an activity: “what it is to be a person, or a rational agent, is just to 
be engaged in the activity of constantly making yourself into a person” (ivi, section 2.4.1; cf. 
supra section 2.2). 
Korsgaard’s characterization of agency in terms of activity builds upon Aristotle’s 
teleological conceptions of objects and activities, and works, in conjunction with her distinctive 
interpretation of the “function argument,”27 to the endorsement of the claim that the function 
of action is to constitute the agent (ivi, section 5.1.3). The organization in virtue of which a 
thing is the kind of thing it is—its functional organization—carries with it normative 
implications, in that it supports normative judgments about the thing itself. 
 
2.5.2 Constitutive Principles and their Double Nature  
Korsgaard calls constitutive standards, or internal standards, the standards that “apply to a 
thing simply in virtue of its being the kind of thing that it is” (ivi, section 2.1.2). Constitutive 
                                                
 
27 I am aware that the talk about ‘function’ and ‘teleological structure’ carries some difficulties. Here, 
however, I am not introducing the Function Argument nor the set of objections and counter-objections to it 
in the literature, since referring to it here is just functional to the reconstruction of Korsgaard’s account. For 





standards have a double nature, in that they are descriptive and normative at once with respect 
to the object they are standard for: 
They are descriptive because an object must meet them, or at least aspire to 
meet them, in order to be what it is. And they are normative because an object 
to which they apply can fail to meet them, at least to some extent, and is 
subject to criticism if it does not. This double nature finds expression in the 
fact that we can criticize such object either by saying that they are poor object 
of their kind (“That’s a poor encyclopedia, it isn’t up to date.”), or by saying 
that they are not such objects at all (“That’s not an encyclopedia: it’s just a 
compendium of nineteenth-century opinion!”). (CA, p. 8) 
Analogously, constitutive principles—i.e., constitutive standards applying to activities—
relate the performer/agent to the corresponding activity in such a way that “we can say that 
unless you are following the principle in question, you are not performing the activity at all” 
(ivi, p. 9).  
Although Korsgaard does not herself trace the connection, reference to the notion of 
constitutive rule and the relevant debates might be helpful here to further clarify the point.28 
Constitutive rules are such that they constitute, rather than merely regulate, the relevant 
practice. Metaphysically speaking, they create, or bring into existence, the practice they are 
rules for (see Glüer & Wikforss, 2009/2015, section 1.2). In their constitutive role, they are 
therefore logically and conceptually prior to the practice in that they define it and set the very 
conditions for its possibility and meaning. Constitutive rules have at the same time a normative 
function, in that they establish what is allowed or prohibited within the activity/practice, and 
normative force, inasmuch as from the point of view of the participants they provide guidance 
about to what to do (cf. Rawls, 1955). 
One potential problem with the double nature of constitutive rules is that a violation would 
automatically imply exclusion from the practice, as a move not compliant with the rules would 
cease the act from counting as an instance of the practice altogether. I have referred to this as 
                                                
 
28 Bertea (2013, pp. 84-89) carefully spells out the connection between the debate on constitutive rules and 
the one about the normative status of constitutive standards of agency. Even though the notions of 
constitutive rules (as articulated by G.H. von Wright and J. Searle), secondary rules (by H. L. A. Hart), and 
practice rules (by J. Rawls) are traceable back to different sorts of debates, they present several similarities 
and are to some extent relatable, deepening our understanding of different aspects of what I will call, in 




the problem of defective action, of which this work is meant to provide clarification (chapters 
three and four), and a solution (chapter five). 
 
2.5.3 Agency’s Metaphysics and Epistemology 
According to Korsgaard, a constitutive principle is therefore an ‘internal standard’ arising 
“from the very nature of the object or activity to which it applies.” Activities are distinguished 
from mere mechanical processes or sequences of events in that they are “by their nature, 
directed, self-guided, by those who engage in them, even if they are not directed or guided with 
reference to external goals” (CA, pp. 7-9).29 For an activity to be self-guided means that it is 
an essentially conscious activity, without necessarily requiring that the one who engages in it 
be conscious that she is doing it (cf. SN, pp. 234-237, especially n. 23). “In the case of 
essentially goal-directed activities,” Korsgaard continues, “constitutive principles arise from 
the constitutive standards of the goals to which they are directed” (CA, p. 8). The internal 
goal/standard of agency being self-constitution, successful actions are those through which an 
agent comes to constitute herself as an internally coherent and unified whole. 
The kind of metaphysics Korsgaard endorses for the concept of activity is a Platonic one:  
the ‘‘precise sense’’ or perfect version of an activity stands in a complex 
relation to the activity, because it is at once both normative and constitutive. 
Although it is not true that you are not performing an activity at all unless 
you do it precisely, it is true that you have to be guided by the precise version 
of the activity in order to be performing the activity at all. And at the same 
time the precise sense sets normative standards for the activity. (SC, section 
2.1.5) 
The concept of action, Korsgaard acknowledges, comes in degrees, and an agent may act in 
ways that unify her to a greater or lesser degree (ivi, sections 1.4.8, 8.5; CA, essay 3). Those 
actions are still actions, but are defective, in that “they fail to constitute their agents as the 
unified authors of their actions” (SC, section 2.1.6). Bad and defective actions are thus ‘tokens’ 
of “the same activity—the activity of self-constitution—badly done” (CA, p. 126; cf. also SC, 
section 6.4.9).  
                                                
 
29 Cf. NCA (section 1.3): “Agency is liable to a standard of success and failure from the inside, that is, by 




The constitutive principles of agency—that is, the standards applying to the activity of self-
constitution—are, according to Korsgaard, the principles of practical reason (specifically, the 
Hypothetical and Categorical Imperative). This comes from the very nature of action, as 
Korsgaard follows Aristotle and Kant in considering an action as “involving both an act and 
an end, an act done for the sake of an end,” and reasons—the considerations supporting the 
choice of an action—as having an essentially reflexive structure. The description of an action 
incorporates therefore a principle (a Kantial maxim, an Aristotelian logos), and the categorical 
imperative in its universal law formulation is both descriptive of and normative for the activity 
of acting for a reason (CA, p. 219; SC, section 1.2).30 
The normative force of the principles of practical reason is analogous to that of the principles 
of logical inference: “they must be principles in accordance with which we operate—either 
well or badly” (CA, p. 7; cf. SC, sections 5.1.3, 5.2). The parallel runs also at the 
epistemological level, as  
Knowledge of the normativity of practical principles doesn’t transform them 
into premises which are then applied, any more than knowledge of the 
normativity of logical principles, like modus ponens, transforms those into 
premises which are then applied. (SC, section 4.2.3) 
Accordingly, the aim of a philosophical theory of agency in spelling out the constitutive 
principles of agency is to illuminate a distinctively practical kind of knowledge:  
What Philosophy leads to when it formulates such principles and reveals the 
sources of their normativity is not knowledge which is then to be applied, 
but rather self-knowledge. That is to say, it leads to a self-conscious 
appreciation of what you are and of how you work, which will make you 
better at being what you are and at working in that way. (Ibid) 
Leaving aside the epistemological aspects of agency, which Korsgaard herself does not 
engage, the present reconstruction of the metaphysics of agency reveals a source of tension 
between the ‘problem of defective actions’ potentially arising from Korsgaard’s 
                                                
 
30 Both the Hypothetical and the Categorical Imperatives (HI and CI) are constitutive principles of action: 
the former (the principle of instrumental reason) concerns the agent’s efficacy, the latter her autonomy—
together they are the constitutive standards of an agent. The HI, however, is already contained into the CI 




characterization of the double nature of constitutive norms, and her acknowledgement that the 
notions of agency and action come in degree.  
The next two chapters are dedicated to an exploration of the problem of defective actions via 
the analysis of two case studies, and to an elucidation of the notion of constitutive norms, 
respectively. Together, they provide a critique of Korsgaard’s account—in particular, her 
conflation of constitutive normativity with moral normativity—, and set the stage for my 




Chapter Three – Defective Agency? 
 
In the previous chapter I provided a comprehensive and abstract reconstruction of Korsgaard’s 
constitutivist theory of agency. This chapter brings the theory into practice, through the 
analysis of two case studies: cases of disorders of agency and of socially displaced agency.  
Since these cases represent two varieties of alleged breakdowns of agency, addressing them 
is particularly relevant to Korsgaard’s theory, in light of what in the literature is known as the 
problem of defective actions. The interpretations of the cases that I rely on and endorse, 
however, make a strong case for considering them as instances of genuine agency, thereby 
occasioning a critical assessment of Korsgaard’s account. This will be done with a view to 
providing a highlight of the theory’s most valuable features, upon which I will build my 
positive proposal in chapter five. Importantly, both of the following cases emphasizes that 
agency constitutively involves an interpersonal, social, and institutional infrastructure, thus 
corroborating Korsgaard’s core claim that responsibility is a practical relation. 
 
3.1 Constitutive Norms and the Problem of Defective Actions 
Constitutive norms, Korsgaard claims, are descriptive and normative at once in that they both 
provide guidance, and constitute, or define, the very activity one is engaged in by being guided 
by, and conforming to, them: 
They are normative, because in performing the activities of which they are 
the principles, we are guided by them, and yet we can fail to conform to them. 
But they are also descriptive, because they describe the activities we perform 
when we are guided by them. (CA, p. 9) 
This type of double-edged sword is rare in philosophical theory, where the normative or the 
ideal is traditionally separated from the descriptive or the real. Most often, philosophers 
postulate an idea as a recognized and separated standard to aim at to improve practice. 
Accordingly, recognizing the mix of the normative and descriptive in agency already sets 
Korsgaard’s account off on a unique foot. 
There seems, however, to be a problem with the thesis about the double nature of constitutive 




fail to conform to them,31 thus suggesting that they are ‘norms for action.’ But given that the 
principles are also descriptive, and a violation of a description is impossible, it would make 
one who fails to conform to them inherently defective as an agent. Since Korsgaard accepts 
the possibility of bad action, then, according to her characterization of constitutive norms, a 
violation would sanction the defective status of the action. In turn, a defective action would fail 
to constitute its author as an agent, up until the exclusion from the kind-membership 
individuated by the norms themselves. The descriptive character of constitutive norms seems 
to make them ‘norms for being.’ Agents, according to Korsgaard, are evaluative kinds: “the 
agent, just as such, is the kind of thing that can succeed or fail” (NCA, section 1.2). By failing 
to conform to the constitutive principles of the activity of self-constitution, one performs 
defective actions that make her less of a fully unified agent, and thus less of an agent—“a mere 
heap” (SC, section 10.2.3; cf. also section 8.2.4): 
Since the function of action is self-constitution, […] bad actions, defective 
actions, are ones that fail to constitute their agents as the unified authors of 
their actions. (Ivi, section 2.1.6) 
To put the problem in a highly schematic form, Korsgaard’s characterization seems to 
present us with the following situation: constitutive norms of agency/action have a double 
nature—they are both descriptive and normative with regard to the activity of self-constitution. 
They describe what an action is (they are norms for being), and at the same time sanction as 
defective instances of actions that do not conform to them (they provide norms for action). In 
addition, given that the relation between an agent and her actions is not one of production, but 
rather of authoring and self-constitution, defectiveness of actions transmits to the agent, 
making her less of a fully unified, and therefore less of an agent. In Korsgaard’s words: 
[…] if your action is unsuccessful and you do not bring about the state of 
affairs that you intended, it is not (or not just) the action that is ineffective. It 
is you that is ineffective. It is not as if you were effective in producing the 
action, but then the action, once out there on its own, failed, like a defective 
machine you have invented and then let loose on the world. The action is not 
your product: it was you that failed. An unsuccessful action renders you 
ineffective. Therefore a successful action is one that renders you effective. A 
similar point holds for autonomy […] Therefore a successful action, an 
                                                
 
31 The ‘error constraint’ is usually thought to be a requirement for a norm to be prescriptive, or action 




action that is good as an action, is one that renders its agent both efficacious 
and autonomous. (SC, section 5.1.4) 
It is the essential nature of action that it has a certain metaphysical property 
[…] But in order to have that metaphysical property it must have a certain 
normative property […] This explains why the action must meet the 
normative standard: it just isn’t action if it doesn’t. (Ivi, section 8.1.3) 
According to Korsgaard, consistency, self-reflection, and self-unification are necessary 
conditions for unified agency, which are also requirements for intentional action (cf. Arruda, 
2016a). Autonomy and efficacy are the “essential characteristics of an agent,” and actions that 
fail to constitute the agent as autonomous and efficacious fail to constitute the agent altogether: 
If you fail to follow the Kantian imperatives you will not be efficacious and 
autonomous, and then you will not be an agent. Your action constitutes you 
as an agent by being chosen in a way that renders you, the agent, efficacious 
and autonomous. (Ivi, section 5.1.3 ff.) 
For the moment, this rough outline of the problem of defective actions should suffice, as it 
will become clearer through the discussion in the next sections. A thorough examination of 
Korsgaard’s characterization of constitutive norms of agency/action will be undertaken in 
chapter four, and chapter five will be devoted to a reframing of Korsgaard’s constitutivist 
account of agency.  In this chapter I am going to discuss cases of ‘disorders of agency,’ which 
are meant to show that while the agent’s actions might ‘misfire’ or fail to display Korsgaard’s 
required pattern of consistency, self-reflection and self-unification (and often, morality), her 
agency does not fade nor disrupt. Moreover, by relying on evidence emerging from therapeutic 
treatments of disorders of agency, I argue, contra Korsgaard, in favor of a clear distinction of 
the notion of agential responsibility from that of moral responsibility, claiming that only the 
former is necessary for agency (cf. supra, sections 2.2, 2.4). 
 
3.2 Disorders of Agency 
In mental health-care practice there is a category of conditions referred to as “personality 
disorders” (PDs).32 The term ‘personality’ stands for a set of traits that incline one to 
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behave/act, think, and feel in stable ways with respect to certain circumstances, which make 
her ‘the kind of person she is.’ PDs are defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM IV-TR, 1994, p. 689) as:  
 
A.   An enduring pattern of experience and behavior that deviates markedly 
from the expectations of an individual’s culture. This pattern is manifested 
in two (or more) of the following areas:  
1.   Cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, 
other people, and events); 
2.   Affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and 
appropriateness of emotional response); 
3.   Interpersonal functioning; and 
4.   Impulse control. 
B.   The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range 
of personal and social situations.  
C.   The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
D.   The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced 
back at least to adolescence or early adulthood. 
E.   The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or 
consequence of another mental disorder. 
F.   The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition 
(e.g., head trauma).  
 
There are several features of PDs that make them a relevant case for a philosophical account 
of agency and for the present discussion, in particular. First, PDs generally, have what Hanna 
Pickard calls a “Janus-faced nature”—i.e., two distinct but closely connected characteristics. 
Beside causing pain and distress to the individual, the problematic traits and patterns of 
behavior involved in PDs also often involve impairment of areas of interpersonal functioning, 
as well as harm to others. For this reason, PDs are considered “a psychiatric condition that 
essentially involves a moral component” (Pickard, 2011, pp. 182-183), and whose management 
poses unique scientific, philosophical, legal, clinical, and practical challenges.33 
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further understanding of personality disorders, drawing on scientific, clinical, philosophical, social, and legal 
perspectives. It also includes a first-person narrative of an ex-service user’s experience of living with 





Second, Pickard points to the fact that PDs lie on a continuum with ‘normal’ human 
personality—normal traits are “taken to the extreme in PD[s]” (Pickard, 2011, p. 182). The 
relationship of ‘continuity’ between PDs and normal traits seems to emerge from the close 
similarities with our ordinary experience and behavior evoked by the first-personal narratives 
of what it is like to live with PD. It is important to stress, however, that the what counts as 
‘normal’ is always articulated in relation to the expectations of a given culture (cf. DSM’s 
characterization above), implying that a major role in the definition of disorders of agency 
related to PDs is played by societal and cultural factors.  
Third, and most importantly, diagnoses of PDs are prompted by symptoms typically 
involving patterns of behavior (actions or omissions thereof) and attitudes, which play a crucial 
role in the maintenance of the condition: 
They could be emotionally cruel, or extremely angry and threatening without 
just cause; they might self-harm or disengage from the Community without 
explanation, provoking high levels of anxiety in others concerned for their 
well-being; they might shirk their Community tasks and responsibilities, 
leaving others to pick up the work. (Pickard, 2013, p. 1135)34 
Conversely, with the appropriate therapeutic, interpersonal, and societal support, people with 
PDs can successfully work to change their problematic behavioral patterns and traits (Pickard, 
2011, p. 182). In other words, the possibility for change and recovery for people with PDs 
crucially involves the exercise of their agency within an appropriate therapeutic interpersonal 
environment. For this reason, and as a result of a clash of intuitions and beliefs she herself 
experienced in approaching the psychiatric practice, Pickard coined the term “disorders of 
agency,” thereby instigating an important shift in focus from ‘personality’ to ‘agency.’ 
Finally, unlike other kinds of disorders of agency (e.g., those associated with schizophrenia 
and Alzheimer), discussion of cases of PDs and their treatment in the context of therapeutic 
communities can be successfully conducted quite independently from any specific empirical 
hypothesis concerning the psychological architecture underlying the impairment (i.e.., Sense 
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(NIMHE) supporting a therapeutic framework for the treatment of people with PDs.  
34 For the present discussion I draw on Pickard (2013), based on Pickard’s own working experience as a 




of Agency/Sense of Ownership, and memory, respectively).35 By considering disorders of 
agency related to PDs, the focus is therefore prominently on the level of 
interpersonal/institutional contexts, relations, and practices, thereby providing a privileged 
insight into the conceptual and normative framework of agency and responsibility. 
Along with the interpretation of these cases provided by Pickard and her specific proposal, 
my claim will be that cases of disorders of agency bear considerable significance for an 
understanding of the way we conceptualize the notion of responsibility and the relevant 
normative practices in non-clinical contexts. This represents a minimal level of normative 
reflection—that is, which contexts should we consider when we model the notion/concept of 
responsibility, whether those carry normative preferences (if so, which those are), and whether 
a homogeneous model would fit our practical needs for the concept of responsibility. 
 
3.3 The Clinical Model of “Responsibility without Blame” 
Pickard’s research and analysis is of further pertinence to my assessment of Korsgaard’s 
account of agency for the following reasons. According to Pickard, clinical practice involving 
service users (i.e., patients) with disorders of agency seems to be at odds with both 
philosophical and ordinary beliefs about the close relation between responsibility and 
evaluative reactive attitudes, where reactive attitudes are considered the evaluative emotional 
responses elicited by the kind of attitude toward us manifested by other people’s behavior, like 
resentment, blame, praise, gratitude. The idea at the core of both the ordinary and the 
philosophical perspective, Pickard observes, is that responsibility is an essentially moral notion 
and that reactive attitudes are integral—either constitutively or, more weakly, via a relation of 
appropriateness—to the practice of holding people responsible. In other words, holding 
someone responsible characteristically involves morally evaluative, personal reactive attitudes.  
Korsgaard seems to be on the same page with respect to the connection between 
responsibility and reactive attitudes. If we think about Korsgaard’s characterization of the two 
implications of the ordinary concept of agency—and of the linchpin between the two, the 
notion of responsibility—we can recall that there were two claims at play. The first, which I 
will refer to as the Identification Thesis, is about the intimate relationship between agents and 
their actions via the notion of personal, or practical identity—of which the actions are a 
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manifestation or expression, thereby qualifying as her actions—since “the most essential part 
of the person is constituted by her actions” (SC, section 5.5.1).36 The second claim states that 
the reactions to someone’s actions—the practical attitudes constitutive of treating someone as 
an agent—are evaluations/assessments, and as such, crucially involve standards of 
appropriateness. Korsgaard’s interpretation of the kind of appropriateness at stake is moral (as 
is the one proper to common-sense).37 I shall call this the Moral Evaluation Claim.  
The two claims work together in Korsgaard’s theory in that agency is characterized both in 
metaphysical terms (as the activity of self-constitution) and in practical terms (as choosing 
what to do, thereby taking responsibility for a specific practical identity that enacts a certain 
pattern of self-reflection and self-deliberation). Since the practical, for Korsgaard, is subsumed 
into the moral (the CI is the constitutive principle of agency), then the fundamental dimension 
of evaluation for agency is the moral one.38 
Paying attention to therapeutic contexts, however, sheds light on the fact that the 
relationships among ‘failures’ of agency (including those involving morally relevant aspects), 
competent agency, responsibility ascriptions, and personal identity, is more complex than 
Korsgaard seems to have it.  
Crucial for the treatment of disorders of agency is the undertaking, on the part of the 
practitioners, of a stance of “responsibility without blame.” In Pickard’s words: 
Service users were responsible for their actions and omissions and 
accountable to the Community for them, but an attitude of compassion and 
empathy prevailed, and they were not blamed. (Pickard, 2013, p. 1135) 
                                                
 
36 Here is the full quote: “The intimate connection between person and action does not rest in the fact that 
action is caused by the most essential part of the person, but rather in the fact that the most essential part of 
the person is constituted by her actions.” I use the Identification Thesis quite vaguely to refer both to the 
metaphysical and the practical relation between an agent and her actions. In the next chapter (section 4.3), 
I distinguish between the metaphysical and the practical counterparts of the Identification Thesis. Later in 
this chapter I use it in a more restrictive way, to refer just to the practical counterpart. Cf. infra, section 3.5. 
37 The reactive attitudes which are supposed to be involved in the identity implication of the ordinary concept 
of agency are “normative or at least personal.” Cf. supra, section 2.3, where I reconstruct the part of 
Korsgaard’s argument that relies on the implications of the ordinary concept of agency.  
38 Cf. SC (section 8.5.2): “[…] integrity in the metaphysical sense—the unity of agency—and in the moral 
sense—goodness—are one and the same property.” Here Korsgaard refers to Kant’s and Plato’s arguments, 
highlighting the same pattern of establishing that a normative property (“universalizability in Kant’s 
argument, justice in Plato”) just is the counterpart of a metaphysical property (“autonomy in Kant’s 
argument, constitutional unity in Plato’s”). Her account follows the same strategy; in other words, Korsgaard 
endorses the “ancient metaphysical thesis of the identification of the real with the good;” (ivi, section 2.1.1). 




For Pickard, blame is a complex emotion involving a negative affect towards the addressee, 
which is characteristically accompanied by a sense of entitlement to that negative reactive 
attitude in relation to the addressee’s wrongdoing. The notion of responsibility without blame 
captures the fact that in their therapeutic relations and interactions with practitioners, service 
users can be successfully held accountable for their actions without being morally evaluated. 
In other words, in these cases, usual components of holding someone accountable for her 
actions, such as ascribing blameworthiness and imposing consequences, remain—with the 
exception of the expression of moral blame. Still, without blame responsibility is preserved, 
and successfully goes through, despite or perhaps in virtue of that very omission. 
Dissecting the elements at play in Pickard’s model of responsibility without blame reveals 
that Therapeutic Communities are interaction spaces between service users and mental health 
practitioners that focus on and encourage change in service users’ behavior. The therapeutic 
nature of these spaces lies in both the goal of the interaction (i.e., fostering change of 
maladaptive patterns of behavior; improvement of interpersonal functioning), and the type of 
relationship between the service users and practitioners (i.e., between a user and a provider of 
a health care service, which is a distinctively asymmetrical relationship). The specificity of the 
situation (in terms of goal and type of relationship) notwithstanding, “it is a presumption of 
treatment,” Pickard explains, “that service users have choice and control over their behavior 
and can therefore be asked to take responsibility for it, as we naturally say.” This presumption 
pervades and structures the interactions within Therapeutic Communities, in that it is made 
explicit through “the language of agency and responsibility.” What service users usually lack, 
is “full conscious knowledge of why they are behaving as they do, or what the full effects of 
their behavior on others may be,” as well as a full control over their behavior. Evidence from 
clinical treatment shows that service users routinely exercise choice and control over their 
behavior “when they have incentive, motivation, and genuinely want to do so” (ivi, pp. 1137-
1138). Control and conscious knowledge are therefore graded notions.  
The fact that this presumption is operative and constitutes a necessary condition for effective 
treatment is crucial, as it means that agency exercised in clinical contexts shares the same 
features, in different degrees, of nonclinical/ordinary contexts. In particular, the parallel with 
the ordinary practice of holding people responsible is maintained in that judgements and 
ascriptions of blameworthiness are not suspended, and the demands (i.e., specific requests, and 
potential imposition of negative consequences) and expectations involved in participating in 
the practice of regarding oneself and holding each other responsible are not lifted either. What 




blame towards service users (where the expression of blame might be considered a minimal 
level of acting on it). By taking a blame-free participatory stance—which is, importantly, 
different from Strawson’s objective stance—practitioners enable an environment where service 
users are not absolved from responsibility, and their agency is positively affirmed, rather than 
denied.  
Pickard’s contention is therefore that if the evaluation at stake in reactive attitudes is 
construed as moral in kind—thus involving moral standards in the ascription of agency and 
responsibility—too close of a connection between responsibility and morality is established; 
in particular, one that obscures the fact that responsibility is a distinctively agential concept, 
alongside, but not synonymous with or a part of, morality. The experience stemming from 
therapeutic treatments of disorders of agency seems to testify exactly to the conceptual and 
practical viability of the distinction between moral and agential responsibility, as the exercise 
of agential capacities can be enhanced specifically by refraining from the moral evaluation 
involved in blaming.39 
In light of the conceptual possibility and practical viability of the clinical stance of 
responsibility without blame, Pickard develops a conceptual framework that clearly 
distinguishes responsibility, blameworthiness, and blame. She distinguishes two varieties of 
blame: affective and detached. Affective blame involves a characteristic ‘sting’ and a moral 
connotation that represents a hindrance to the effective exercise and improvement of the service 
user’s agential capacities. On the other hand, what makes detached blame conducive to 
effectively securing service users’ accountability and change in behavior is that it is devoid of 
“a sense of entitlement to any negative reactive attitudes and emotions one might experience, 
no matter what the service user has done” (ivi, pp. 1141, 1146).40 
 
3.4 Relevance of the Clinical Model for the Present Work 
What emerges from the clinical practice with sufferers of disorders of agency shows that while 
their participation in responsibility practices—i.e., being considered as responsible agents and 
                                                
 
39 To be sure, the distinction between causal, or explanatory, responsibility and moral responsibility is a 
customary one in debates on responsibility. For a “structured taxonomy of responsibility concepts” (STRC) 
see Vincent (2011). See del Corral (2015) for a characterization of ‘agential responsibility’ as explanatory 
responsibility. 
40 Pickard’s notion of ‘affective’ blame is similar to, but differs under important respects from, Angela 




held in relations of accountability—is indeed a necessary condition for them to effectively be 
accountable and take responsibility for their actions, thereby exercising agential capacities, 
moral evaluation is not essential to it, and could actually be a hindrance. I therefore side with 
Pickard in maintaining that these concepts should be best understood in morally neutral terms. 
Getting back to the assessment of Korsgaard’s proposal, this consideration seems to pose a 
serious challenge to the Moral Evaluation Claim—that is, morally evaluative reactive attitudes 
are not necessary for the practice of holding someone responsible. My suggestion is therefore 
that the Moral Evaluation Claim be turned into the Agential Responsibility Claim. While this 
move constitutes a seemingly minor adjustment to Korsgaard’s theory, it is one with big 
repercussions, in that a more nuanced account of agency—in particular, one that clearly 
distinguishes between moral responsibility and agential responsibility—would thereby 
broaden the scope of humans we can consider, and who can understandably consider 
themselves, as agents. 
Elaborating on the elements pinpointed by Pickard as central to the presumption of treatment 
in clinical contexts,41 I will regard as agential those capacities in virtue of which an agent is 
responsible (without blame), or can take responsibility for, her behavior. Agential capacities 
include: i) conscious knowledge of what one is doing,42 ii) choice, and iii) a degree of control 
over one’s behavior. Accordingly, I propose the following claim: 
Agential Responsibility Claim: treating someone as an agent is to treat her 
as accountable/answerable for her actions, which presupposes that she has 
knowledge of what she is doing, can exercise choice and a degree of control 
over her behavior. 
It is this presupposition’s structuring of the interpersonal attitudes and reactions to one’s 
behavior that proves to be a necessary condition for exercising agency. In other words, it is not 
just the agent’s individual psychological arrangement that matters for agency, but rather the 
fact any such capacity of the individual agent is actually acknowledged/recognized, and 
                                                
 
41 Here I draw on Pickard’s characterization of what is presupposed by effective clinical treatment. (Ivi, p. 
1141).  
42 Pickard’s understanding of this notion is admittedly an intuitive one. By ‘conscious knowledge’ of 
behavior she refers to “the way we normally know what we are doing when we are doing when we do it. 
[…] Normally, we have some knowledge of why we are acting, some knowledge of how we are acting, some 
knowledge of what we intend in acting, and some knowledge of what effects our actions have on the world” 




interacted with, within an interpersonal relation. What will be involved in actually treating 
someone as responsible will vary depending on the context, the nature of the relationship with 
her, along with a consideration of her past personal history. In any case, it will involve some 
concrete effects in terms of re-action/response, to the agent’s actions. 
While corroborating the relevance of Korsgaard’s approach to responsibility as a practical 
relation for the notion of agency, treatment of disorders of agency indicates that those who in 
Korsgaard’s terms would be ‘mere heaps,’ (and therefore less of fully unified agents) (cf. supra, 
section 3.1) would rather seem to be always already agents, and never cease to be such (see 
also Millgram, 2014). The process of recovery for people with disorders of agency—whose 
actions/omissions would, according to Korsgaard, consistently fall short of making them 
unified agents—shows that any degree of realization of one’s agential capacities, as manifested 
in her actions, is sufficient to hold her accountable for her behavior, and for her to effectively 
take responsibility for those actions. A ‘disorder of agency’ does not make the person who is 
diagnosed with it defective qua agent. The defect, then, would not be in her agency. Rather, it 
would be in the dysfunctional dynamics of the agent’s proximal relational environment, and in 
those resulting from her past history (including the complex, overlapping influence of many 
different structural societal factors).  
Overall, disorders of agency and their treatments point to the relational, interactional 
character of agency and responsibility, as well as their social dimension. The discussion in the 
present chapter is meant to challenge the very idea of defectiveness attached to the term 
‘disorder,’ stemming from the placement of moral blame on an individual. 
Alternately, we should consider agency as a complex and interactive capacity, the exercise 
of which crucially depends on interpersonal relationships and contextual factors—at any 
degree or stage of actualization. A characterization of agency in these terms would imply not 
just that a lack of appropriate interpersonal relationships and material opportunities might 
importantly impact on the development and exercise of the capacity of agency—which 
Korsgaard herself would certainly concede (cf. supra, section 2.2)—but eventually lead to the 




Interaction Claim: agency itself is constitutively a function of one’s location 
within a network of social and interpersonal relationships,43 as well as of the 
quality of these relationships, as perceived by the agent.44 
The hypothesis central to the reframing of constitutivism as a theory of agency that I pursue 
in this work intends therefore to build upon and strengthen Korsgaard’s practical approach to 
agency and responsibility. On the other hand, it carries with it important differences, that will 
be illustrated in due course. 
 
3.5 Socially Displaced and Distorted Agency 
By challenging the categorization of ‘disorders’ of agency as instances of defective agency, the 
previous sections were meant to make a case for distinguishing agency as a capacity from its 
actualization in an agent’s actions. The connection between agential capacities and the practice 
of holding someone responsible for their actions has been emphasized by introducing the 
Interaction Claim. Taken together, these two moves are designed to shift the focus from 
conceiving of the Identification Thesis (regarding the relation between an agent and her 
actions) as a metaphysical relation (of self-constitution), to a practical relation—i.e., taking 
place within interpersonal and social interaction.  
A further instructive case to illustrate the interactive/relational character of agency, and 
therefore to support the Interaction Claim, is that of agency exercised in contexts of oppression 
and violence. In the Disorders scenario discussed above, the role of interpersonal relations and 
practices of accountability was showed to be a necessary condition for the agent to effectively 
develop and exercise their agential capacities. In the Displacement scenario presented in this 
section, the Interaction Claim gains (indirect) support by looking at the negative impact that 
societal relations might have on individual agents’ ability to actualize their agency. In these 
cases, agency operates despite/against/within structures of power and oppression which 
systematically distorts the intentions of some agents. As a result, the characteristic practical 
                                                
 
43 For example, the cases of feral children: being isolated from other people prevents them from having 
agency in any usual sense of the word. Another example is that of solitary confinement, that has proven to 
have disintegrating/destroying effects on sense of self (see Gallagher (2014, section 3) for an overview), 
which I would expect to extend to agency as well. 
44 Think, for example, of the importance of trust and trustful relationships for adequately developing and 
exercising one’s agential capacities, or of the (enhancing/diminishing) effects connected with interiorizing 




relation of ‘authorship’ between an agent and the actions she performs, is bent to the effect that 
the actions’ locus of significance is displaced from their agents. 
The Displacement scenario represents a problem for Korsgaard’s theory because a consistent 
failure in the agent’s efficacy—i.e., the “success in actually performing the action, in doing 
something that counts as an action” (NCA, section 1.1)—would eventually fail to make her an 
agent at all, if anything by disempowering the agents’ potential for agency via the 
internalization of derogatory labels and other mechanisms of social discrimination and 
oppression.45 The interpretation of the Displacement scenario that I favor in the following 
section, on the contrary, accounts for the ‘displacement effect’ without obliterating the agency 
of the disenfranchised individuals. The explanation I will provide for how that is the case relies 
on the Interaction Claim and calls for a further investigation of its connection with the 
Identification Thesis. Before getting there, let me introduce the cases of displaced agency.   
The process through which agency gets displaced from an agent has been characterized as a 
form of “social authoring:”  
As an example of social authoring of action, we can refer to the 2005 media 
coverage of Hurricane Katrina, which fixated on reports of looting in flooded 
New Orleans (Sommers et al. 2006). Two photographs published by different 
news agencies captured the public’s attention: One photo features white-
skinned people traveling through the flooded area carrying food, and 
includes the caption, “Two residents wade through chest-deep water after 
finding bread and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina 
came through the area in New Orleans, Louisiana” (Agence France Press 
2005). The other image is nearly identical except the subject of the photo is 
a black man, and this time the caption reads, “A young man walks through 
chest deep flood water after looting a grocery store in New Orleans” 
(Associated Press 2005). Defining their actions as “finding” and “looting,” 
the captions diverged in how they narrated the same apparent intentional 
action. Although the caption for the white-skinned agents abstained from 
normative explanations about their actions, the caption for the black agent 
affirmatively criminalized him and his actions, and institutionalized that 
characterization by reporting it as news. […] Some have contended that the 
divergent captions are a consequence of different standards for the two news 
agencies that published their respective photos and captions. However, 
analysts have shown that the captions were consistent with the media’s 
                                                
 
45 See essays collected in Andersen & Collins (2016). For an overview on internalized oppression see Willett 
et al. (1999/2015); on epistemic oppression and epistemic injustice see Dotson (2013, 2012), and Fricker 




overall pattern of racialized characterizations of individuals surviving the 
aftermath of the hurricane (for example, Sommer et al. 2006). […]  
Scenarios such as the looting/finding example highlight how intention is not 
just authored by the agent, but is also socially authored through others’ 
discernment and translation of that action. The term social authoring is 
meant to convey a relationship of production between “observer” and “act.” 
I distinguish between social authoring and “social reading” of an act: To read 
an act is to apprehend an existing meaning, but to author an act is to create 
something new. When facilitated by reasoning designed to reinforce and 
rationalize systems of domination, social authoring relies on and further 
entrenches an institutionally sanctioned distortion of the intentions of some 
agents. (Bierria, 2014, pp. 129-130, 142 n. 1)46 
Alisa Bierria’s example and analysis quoted above provides us with an important theoretical 
perspective on the social dimension of agency. Korsgaard’s acknowledgement of this 
dimension can be found, in a minimal form, in her account of responsibility as a practical 
relation of mutual reciprocity entered by the agent, inasmuch as she is engaged in the activities 
of practical reasoning and of exchanging reasons (cf. supra, section 2.4). Significantly, 
Korsgaard’s claim that the practical relations entered by participating in practices of mutual 
accountability seems to imply that those relations are inherently symmetrical, and actualized 
by default in virtue of the agent’s acting in conformity with the principles of practical 
reasoning.  
The phenomenon of socially displaced agency, however, reveals that it is not just the 
normative relations among the agent’s mental states, established through the activity of 
practical reasoning and the exchange of reasons (i.e., not just her individual process of self-
constitution) that matter for agency. What is relevant for the successful performance of an 
agent’s action is also the uptake on the part of other agents—that is, a relation of dependence 
on others for the action to be understood as having a certain meaning, and to take the 
corresponding intended effect.47 The uptake is in turn a function of the normative relations 
among the agent and her social and institutional environment, and those relations might also 
be such that the authoring process of the agent’s intentional actions is displaced from her and 
                                                
 
46 See the original paper for the references in the quote. 
47 Here I am relying on a parallel between agency and linguistic communication, where the notion of uptake 
and reciprocity on the part of an audience are considered a condition for the successful performance of an 
illocutionary act by a speaker. See Austin (1962/1975), Sbisà (2009), Hornsby (1995), Kukla (2014). Cf. 




subject to distortion—the meaning of her actions is thus defined away from her. In the 
finding/looting case, it is a feature of the agent’s identity as a member of a racialized group 
that triggers a criminalized labelling of the action, thereby revealing the structural character of 
racism as a form of discrimination and oppression—that is, embedded, interiorized, 
reproduced, reinforced, and even legitimized, within social structures.   
 
3.6 Relevance of the Phenomenon of Social Authoring for the Present Work 
To be sure, the process of social authoring of an action is not inherently bad. If anything, it is 
key to understanding the role played by collective intentionality for both individual and 
shared/collective agency. However, the potential for, and persistence of, mismatches between 
the action as intended by the subject who performs it, and the action as attributed to her (or, as 
Bierria claims, authored away from her), raises the question of what the relation between the 
reading and the authoring of an action is, and calls for a closer examination of the distinction 
between the exercise of agency, attributions/ascriptions of agency, and their reciprocal 
connection.  
How do these questions impact on the Identification Thesis that I have identified as central 
to Korsgaard’s account? How do individual and collective agency relate to each other? How 
does morality—or better, lack thereof, in terms of various forms of structural injustices 
pervading and structuring agents’ field of possibilities for action—connect to agency, after all? 
All of these issues are deserving of their own dedicated study in the future. 
For present purposes, the most pressing question prompted by cases of socially 
displaced/distorted agency via social authoring is whether social uptake is necessary for 
agency. Are cases of displaced agency ‘failures’ of agency? Bierria is very straightforward in 
claiming that although the phenomenon of social authoring displaces some agents’ agency, it 
does not ‘disable’ nor ‘erase’ it: While individual agency is sanctioned/validated by social 
uptake, it does not depend on it. Characterizing the phenomenon in terms of a ‘failure’ of the 
oppressed subject’s agency, Bierria contends, is inaccurate and misleading:  
Disenfranchised agents are ‘doing their part’ to reflect, reason, visualize, 
anticipate —intend— and meaningfully act according to their intention […] 
The failure in these cases does not emerge from these actors’ agency, but 
lives in the distortion of these subjects’ intentions by others as well as the 





Bierria’s proposal is then to drop “a binary or scaled model of agency that gauges subjects 
as having more or less, abled or disabled, or successful or failed agency,” and adopt instead a 
“heterogeneous framework” of agency, which acknowledges different kinds of agency. The 
kind of agency exercised by an agent—which, Bierria proposes, can be hegemonic, alien, or 
insurgent/resistant/subversive—depends on how factors pertaining to the social dimension 
“position her in relation to others when practicing intentional action in the social sphere” (ibid). 
Whether hegemonic, insurgent or otherwise, I will explore the hypothesis that the exercise of 
any kind of agency involves some sort of interpersonal uptake or recognition (be it that of a 
minority, down to just another person).  
Without following Bierria’s proposal of adopting a heterogeneous framework of agency, her 
analysis of the phenomenon of displaced agency is important in its own for the aims at issue. 
It helps clarify that human agency is an inherently relational/interactive phenomenon, and that 
the reciprocal position of the interacting agents is crucial. Overall, Bierria’s analysis 
corroborates the conclusions drawn from the case of disorders of agency. That is, that agential 
power and status are constitutively sensitive to the position an agent occupies in the relevant 
network of societal and institutional normative relations. These relations provide the 
architecture (cf. Haslanger, 2015), or infrastructure—so to speak—within which agents come 
to be and operate. Individual agents, on their part, do, however, also play an active role in 
creating, maintaining/reinforcing, or challenging and reforming their infrastructure.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined two alleged types of defective agency—disorders of agency, and 
socially displaced agency—, and presented evidence in favor of considering them as instances 
of genuine agency instead. This revealed Korsgaard’s constitutive norms of agency as neither 
necessary nor sufficient to account for the alleged defects, which prompted a targeted criticism 
of her account, followed by the proposal of a few emendations.  
My criticism addressed Korsgaard’s assimilation of the constitutive normativity of agency 
to moral normativity, and the problematic consequences of the double nature of constitutive 
norms. The problem is that the assimilation results in the potential exclusion of defective agents 
from the category of agents altogether. My positive proposals for adjustment take up and 
strengthen elements of Korsgaard’s own account, such as her relational account of 
responsibility—supported by the discussion of both the Disorders and the Displacement 




I argued in favor of i) a morally neutral notion of agential responsibility, which features a 
reference to the agent’s capacities exercised and developed (to different degrees) through 
participation in interpersonal practices of accountability (without blame) for one’s actions (the 
Agential Responsibility Claim), and ii) a relational and context-sensitive definition of agency, 
which takes agency to be constitutively a function of one’s location within interpersonal and 
social relationships, as well as of the quality of these relationships as perceived by the agent  
(the Interaction Claim). 
In the next chapter I undertake a clarification of the metaphysics of agency and of the notion 
of constitutive normativity, which sets the stage for the specification of my positive proposal 
in chapter five. It is also required to make sense of Korsgaard’s characterization of the notion 
of constitutive norms and the core of her theory—the Identification Thesis identified above 






Chapter Four – The Metaphysics of Normativity and Agency 
 
In this chapter I provide a conceptual elucidation of the notion of constitutive 
norms/normativity, which is central to constitutivism as a first-order theory of agency. I present 
three possible interpretations (which are not meant to be exhaustive) of Korsgaard’s 
characterization of the notion of constitutive norms. I endorse one of them—the Practical 
Interpretation—as the best way to make sense of the notion while accounting for some of the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter. For Korsgaard, the constitutive norms governing 
agency amount to the norms governing practical reasoning and morality. In this chapter I argue 
that the constitutive normativity pertaining to human agency is not ‘homogeneous’ in kind. In 
other words, the point of this chapter is to show that there are more norms governing agency 
than just the norms for practical reasoning—and, in particular, that agency necessarily involves 
social norms distinct from any notion of practical reasoning. 
I analyze the core of Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory, exemplified by the Identification 
Thesis introduced in the previous chapter, as consisting of two parts, and take up the 
metaphysical part of the claim (about functional normativity), and the practical one (on 
attributability) in turn. By drawing on a theoretical framework on the metaphysics of 
normativity developed within the philosophy of biology, I distinguish two varieties of 
constitutive normativity (socially-generated and non-practice-based), and provide a 
preliminary articulation of the socially-generated constitutive normativity inspired by the 
speech-act-theoretical account of the performative dimension of language. 
Taking this detour on the metaphysics of normativity will clear the way for the proposal of 
a reframing of agency in the next chapter, which expands on the practice-based aspects of 
Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory and positively takes into account the methodological 
constraints set by the analysis of the alleged cases of defective actions conducted in chapter 
three. 
 
4.1 Disambiguating ‘Normativity’ in Korsgaard’s Constitutivist Argument 
An intended strength of Korsgaard’s constitutivist project is its aiming at bringing together 
metaphysical as well as psychological aspects of normativity. Korsgaard’s use of the terms 
‘normative’ and ‘normativity,’ however, oscillates between different meanings. In order to 




looking at what kind of role the specific stage or step plays in the overall constitutivist 
argument. 
Korsgaard’s constitutivist argument, as reconstructed in chapter one above, is the following: 
(1) Human beings must act 
(2) In order to act, human beings must unify themselves into agents 
(3) Human beings can only be unified into agents when they cohere with the 
principles of practical rationality 
(C) So, human beings as unified agents must act in accordance with the 
principles of practical rationality 
Having set aside any intention to assess the meta-normative ambition of Korsgaard’s project 
in its foundational aspect—that is, the vindication of normative authority of normative claims 
of practical reason—the aim of the present work is to clarify the relevant sense of normativity 
pertaining to the first-order level of the constitutivist theoretical nucleus advanced by 
Korsgaard. This constitutivist theoretical nucleus amounts to the metaphysical-cum-normative 
claim about action/agency having a constitutive aim/function, which sets normative 
principles/standards (premises 2 and 3 in the argument), along with the claim about the 
inescapability of acting (premise 1). 
Now, the interpretation of the Disorders scenario endorsed in the previous chapter, if sound, 
shows that the Moral Evaluation Claim at play in Korsgaard’s account is highly contentious.48 
I have claimed that a notion of agential responsibility as distinct from moral responsibility 
carries more predictive and explanatory power regarding the exercise of agency. To recall, 
Korsgaard claims that the constitutive principle of agency is the moral law.49 If my conclusion 
that human beings can and do ‘unify’ themselves into agents outside the moral law is correct, 
then premise 3 of Korsgaard’s constitutivist argument is false. The constitutive normativity 
proper to agency does not per se entail the normativity of morality. 
                                                
 
48 I.e., a moral failure does not imply a failure of agency; bad/defective actions do not transmit failure to the 
agent qua agent.  
49 Cf. SC (pp. xii-xiii): “the kind of unity that is necessary for action cannot be achieved without a 
commitment to morality. […] the only way in which you can constitute yourself well is by governing 
yourself in accordance with universal principles which you can will as laws for every rational being. It 
follows that you can’t maintain the integrity you need in order to be an agent with your own identity on any 
terms short of morality itself. […] a commitment to the moral law is built right into the activity that, by 
virtue of being human, we are necessarily engaged in: the activity of making something of ourselves. The 




It is important to stress once again that the step in the argument that carries the normative 
weight/import/implications is made in the characterization of what, metaphysically, agency is 
(roughly, premise 2). Having ruled out moral normativity, what does, then, constitutive 
normativity—i.e., the normativity of constitutive norms/principles governing the constitution 
of agents—consist in? What is its nature, and what is the kind of necessity attached to it? In 
what follows, I provide three possible interpretations of Korsgaard’s characterization of 
constitutive norms of agency in order to assess the plausibility of those interpretations in light 
of the analysis of cases of supposed defective agency conducted in the previous chapter. 
 
4.2 Elucidating Constitutive Normativity 
The constitutivist theoretical nucleus of Korsgaard’s account—as exemplified by premise 2: 
“In order to act, human beings must unify themselves into agents”—amounts to the following 
two claims. On the one hand, there is the claim that (i) agency/action is a functional kind, or 
that the function of action is to constitute the one who exercises it/performs it into a unified 
agent, and denotes the special (metaphysical) relation between the agent and her actions: a 
relation of self-constitution. In other words, there is no (unified) agent preexisting her actions. 
On the other hand, we have the claim that (ii) the essential feature of an action is whole-person 
attributability, or its being authored; where being authored/whole-person attributability refers 
to the (practical) relation between an agent and her actions as mediated by the notion of 
personal, or practical identity, which denotes the agent’s engagement in practical reasoning 
and deliberation. 
According to what I have identified as the Identification Thesis, someone’s actions, 
Korsgaard claims, constitute her most essential part, and are the expression/manifestation of 
her practical identity, or capacity for normative self-government.50 With this rough recap of 
Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory of agency/action in place, let us turn to the task of clarifying 
the notion of constitutive normativity operating within it. 
As we saw in chapter two, Korsgaard puts forwards an elaborated account of the psychology 
and metaphysics of agency, revolving around the notion of constitutive principles, or norms. 
Let start, then, with a look into what constitutive norms are. According to Korsgaard’s most 
                                                
 




recent characterization of constitutive norms, they “arise from the nature of the object.” The 
idea, she specifies, breaks up in two parts: 
Constitution Requirement (C): “unless the object conforms to the standard, 
it ceases to be the kind of object that it is.”  
Self-constitution Requirement (SC): “the object makes itself into the kind of 
object that it is by conforming to the standard.” (AKC, section 1.2) 
This characterization of constitutive norms is meant to capture what for Korsgaard is a 
crucial feature of constitutive normativity—internality—according to which an entity’s 
liability to standards is part of its constitution.51 In other words, the source of constitutive norms 
of agency lies in the nature of agency itself. The characterization is also meant to encode the 
double nature of constitutive norms/principles—i.e., the fact that the norms have both 
descriptive and normative implications with regard to the activity they are norms of. They 
constitute the very activity they govern, thereby describing the conditions for the possibility of 
agency itself; and they are in force, thereby exerting a normative role, for the individual, under 
pain of kind-membership exclusion.52 This double nature is the hallmark of constitutive 
normativity. 
At this point, having exposed the supposed cases of defective agency as instances of genuine 
agency in chapter three, we are left with the task of determining if Korsgaard’s characterization 
of the constitutive norms of agency can be interpreted in a way that accounts for the conclusions 
reached at the end of those cases. If there is an interpretation, then we merely need to take it 
up, along with the suggested changes to the normative theory of agency suggested in chapter 
three, to be able to include those with disorders of agency and those whose agency is subject 
to displacement as agents proper. If not, we will have to suggest alterations to her more 
foundational characterization of the constitutive norms of agency to cover the appropriate 
anomalies. In what follows I present three possible interpretations of Korsgaard’s 
characterization of constitutive norms reconstructed above.  
                                                
 
51 Cf. NCA (section 1.3): “Agency is liable to a standard of success and failure from the inside, that is, by 
virtue of its own nature: such liability is part of its constitution.” 
52 The normative character of constitutive norms has been targeted by the ‘Why be an agent?’ objection, 
exemplified by Enoch (2006, 2011). Undertaking a reconstruction and assessment of the objection is beyond 
the scope of the present work, but represents an important issue to account for given constitutivist strategies’ 
claims about the inescapability and non-optionality of agency. For a defense of constitutivism against the 





4.2.1 The Metaphysical Interpretation 
According to what I will call the Metaphysical Interpretation, the constitutive principles of 
agency are metaphysical principles describing the formal principle of agency—that is, self-
determined efficacy. As a result, kind-membership (i.e., whether someone is an agent and 
genuinely exercises agency) depends on a certain relation between her and her behavior being 
in place—that is, by the fact that actions are those pieces of behavior instantiating a certain 
metaphysical property (autonomy/constitutional unity) that reflects on the agent. The kind of 
necessity associated with constitutive norms, under this interpretation, would amount to 
metaphysical necessity.  
This interpretation is supported by Korsgaard’s deliberate pursuit, within her constitutivist 
project, of a characterization of the metaphysics of normativity, which results in several distinct 
claims. These are: her endorsement of the ‘classical view’ that normative principles are 
principles of the unification of the manifold; the claim about the interdependence of the 
metaphysical and the normative properties essential to the nature of action (SC, sections 2.1.1, 
8.1.3); and, finally, her statement that the appropriate metaphysics for the concept of activity 
is a Platonic metaphysics. Besides inheriting many potentially problematic issues associated 
with each of the individual claims supporting it (which I am going to overlook, here), the major 
problem with the Metaphysical Interpretation is that it is inherently unstable, in that it tends to 
collapse on the Individual Psychology Interpretation (presented below).  
Korsgaard takes agency’s metaphysical property (autonomy/constitutional unity) to 
ultimately amount to the agent’s psychic unity, issuing from the process of self-reflection, and 
resulting in her maxims/principles of choice displaying a certain normative property 
(universalizability/justice) (ivi, sections 8.1.3, 10.2.3). The way the formal principle of agency 
is given specific content, Korsgaard claims, is through the contingent practical identities, 
which—by providing the agent with reasons for acting—determine a functioning self. 
However, as mentioned, on this account the metaphysical necessity associated with constitutive 
norms, would collapse into a sort of psychological necessity. Let us turn, then, to the Individual 
Psychology Interpretation. 
 
4.2.2 The Individual Psychology Interpretation 
According to the Individual Psychology Interpretation, the constitutive norms of agency 




or to author an action. This was, in a nutshell, the idea behind Korsgaard’s version of the 
authorship view.53 As we have seen, according to Korsgaard, exercising agency amounts to 
being engaged in a self-guiding activity—that is, an essentially conscious activity—even 
though the explicit awareness that one is engaged in such an activity does not necessarily have 
to be available to the agent. And yet, the compliance to agency’s constitutive norms is crucially 
mediated by the agent’s own conception of herself as an agent. This is where Korsgaard’s 
notion of practical/personal identity, and the normative role associated with it—i.e., the fact 
that it provides reasons for acting—come into play.  
If we interpret the constitutive norms of agency along the Individual Psychology 
Interpretation, however, we have to face the following predicament—compliance (to any 
degree, and at any level of conscious awareness) with the constitutive norms of agency would 
be not necessary for an individual to be engaged in the activity of self-constitution because less 
than fully unified selves are always already agents. Compliance with the norms of agency under 
the Individual Psychology Interpretation, would also be not sufficient for successfully 
exercising agency, since perfectly unified selves without appropriate 
external/contextual/societal backup are not able to act as they intend.  
To recall, the conclusion reached in discussing the Disorders scenario was that what proves 
crucial to the exercise of someone’s agency is her being held in interpersonal relationships, 
being treated as legitimate terms in relationships of accountability independently of the 
psychological quality (i.e., the realization of higher order self-reflection capacities, ensuing in 
a more unified self) their actions might display. If anything, it is through inclusion and 
participation in practices of accountability that the relevant psychological organization can be 
implemented. As to the Displacement case, the conclusion reached was that even when agents 
successfully intend and meaningfully act according to their intentions, the normative relations 
between them and their environment can be such that the characteristic relation of authorship 
they entertain to their actions is systematically displaced/distorted, and yet, their agency is 
neither disabled nor erased.  
What these scenarios show is that an interpretation of constitutive norms of agency focused 
on the Individual Psychology is therefore partial, and urges us to look beyond the individual 
agent’s psychological arrangement. In particular, both cases of alleged defective agency point 
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to the necessity to look at the individual’s interpersonal and social relationships. Let us, then, 
consider a final possible interpretation of constitutive norms—the Practical Interpretation.   
  
4.2.3 The Practical Interpretation 
According to the Practical Interpretation, the constitutive norms of agency describe the practice 
of agency. Exercising agency means to participate into a practice—a rule-/norm-governed 
activity—whose dynamics/functioning can be described through the constitutive norms.  
The Practical Interpretation of constitutive normativity is textually well supported, as well. 
Korsgaard’s takes herself to be engaged in providing a practical account of responsibility.54 
She follows the Strawsonian strategy of accounting for the notion of responsibility in terms of 
an agent’s being in a network of interpersonal relations, qua member of a certain community.55 
This practical account was explicitly propounded in opposition to metaphysical approaches to 
responsibility (Korsgaard, 1992/1996b), and, plausibly, to merely psychological ones. It is a 
practical account because it refers to the normative practice of holding each other responsible 
for our actions, characterized by interpersonal relationships, attitudes, and expectations 
towards others qua persons. Participating in such a practice amounts to inhabiting the 
perspective of a practically deliberating agent and entering practical relations of reciprocity 
with other agents—i.e., treating them as responsible persons and committing oneself to be so 
treated—through the exchange of reasons which makes joint deliberation and commitment 
possible. Inasmuch as one first-personally engages in and evaluates practical reasoning and 
deliberation, constitutive norms set standards of evaluation and specify what is permissible, 
forbidden or prescribed for being acknowledged and being held in the practice, thereby playing 
a markedly normative function. 
By focusing on agency qua interpersonal activity/practice, the Practical Interpretation seems 
well suited to positively account for the conclusion drawn from Disorders and Displacement 
cases. In particular, it fits in with the relational definition of what it is to be an agent exemplified 
                                                
 
54 Although Korsgaard’s and other Strawsonian accounts concern ‘moral’ responsibility, I take their 
‘practical route’ to defining the notion to coherently hold also for what I have labelled as ‘agential 
responsibility.’ 
55 As anticipated (cf. supra, sections 2.4 n. 24, and 2.5 n. 25), I see the metaphysical turn in Korsgaard’s 
latest work to be a departure from the practical character of the constructivist enterprise she takes herself to 
be engaged in. For an interpretation of the evolution of Korsgaard along this trajectory—i.e., seeing her latest 
account as expressing a metaphysical, rather than practical, route to agential notions—see Zheng (2016, p. 




by my Agential Responsibility Claim. The issue remains open, however, about the provenance 
(biological, psychological, cognitive, rational, conventional, social, moral, …) of constitutive 
norms of agency, and therefore about whether constitutive norms of agency are ‘homogeneous’ 
in kind. In light of the discussion of the cases of alleged defective agency, there are prima facie 
reasons for hypothesizing that they are not. Notably, the normativity pertaining to agency is 
not exhausted by a single kind of normativity (i.e., rational normativity) and features instead a 
fair amount of conventionality and practice-based norms, along with possibly being subject to 
other sorts of (non-practice-based) normative constraints—including milder, descriptive forms 
of normativity. 
In other words, even if principles of practical rationality are constitutive—to varying 
degrees—of human agency, other conditions might equally qualify as ‘constitutive’ of 
(internal/essential to) intentional human agency, as the following sections will illustrate. If this 
is the case, the indigenous variety of constitutive norms/normativity, along with the 
consolidated philosophical tendency to consider different kinds of normativity as irreducible 
to one another,56 calls for further investigation in the notion: Are different kinds of norms all 
equally constitutive of agency? Are they constitutive of the same aspects of agency? The 
coherence of a constitutivist account of agency hinges on disentangling the different varieties 
of normativity associated with the notion of constitutive norms.  
 
4.3 On the Metaphysics of Agency and Normativity 
In the above section, I considered three possible interpretations of Korsgaard’s characterization 
of constitutive norms. I did this because clarifying what kind of norms constitutive norms are, 
or what kind of normativity constitutive normativity is, represents a crucial step for assessing 
the viability of Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory of agency. The result of the comparison 
revealed that the Practical Interpretation is the most promising to positively account for the 
alleged anomalous cases of Disorders and Displacement discussed in the last chapter, while at 
the same time being consistent with the spirit of Korsgaard’s overall philosophical project, 
conceived of in terms of a practical enterprise (CA, pp. 23, 321-326), as well as preserving the 
                                                
 
56 I am assuming that natural facts display a form of descriptive normativity. If this assumption holds, loci 
classici of the irreducibility claim would then be David Hume’s ‘is/ought’ problem and G. E. Moore’s ‘open 
question’ argument. More on ‘natural normativity’ framework infra, section 4.4 ff. For a basic distinction of 
varieties of normativity between soft and robust kinds irreducible to one another, see, for example, Zaiber 




central features of the Individual Psychology Interpretation. In the remainder of this chapter I 
will undertake a conceptual clarification necessary to take positive steps towards a reframing 
of Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory of agency and action which fully embraces and elaborates 
on the Practical Interpretation. 
 
4.3.1 Scope and Methodology  
First of all, I shall tackle some methodological issues to make clear how I operate in providing 
such a clarification, following Amie Thomasson’s distinction among three different kinds of 
questions asked in contemporary metaphysics. First, Thomasson identifies existence questions: 
questions about what does and does not exist. Answering such questions produces an ontology. 
Existence questions might be, in Carnap’s sense, internal—i.e., questions “asked within (or 
using) a linguistic framework,” whose “answers may be ‘found either by purely logical 
methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a 
factual one’,”—and external—“questions about the existence or reality of the system of entities 
as a whole” (Thomasson, 2012, section 1.1).57 Second, there are relational questions, targeting 
how many ‘levels of reality’ are there and in what kind of relation (of reduction, supervenience, 
truthmaking, grounding) they stand to each other. Finally, modal questions ask what 
“properties an object must have to be of a certain type, […] about what it would take for 
something of a given sort (or for an individual) to exist: about the existence conditions for 
things of various kinds” (ivi, preamble). 
Taking up Korsgaard’s project of providing a constitutivist theory of human agency amounts 
to answering the modal question ‘What would it take for someone to be an agent?’ restricted 
to this/the actual world (or nearby possible ones). In so far as the question asks for identity 
conditions, it is also an existence question, specifically, of the internal kind. The question is 
asked within the linguistic and conceptual framework of the ‘manifest image’ of human 
agency—i.e., the conceptual framework in terms of which human beings conceive of 
themselves as agents (cf. supra, section 1.1.2). As to the relational questions, the constitutivist 
theory of agency I am after is non-reductive: both the psychological (in a broad sense, to 
encompass cognitive, conative and volitional elements) and the normative dimensions of 
agency are equally recognized as parts of reality. While no attempt is made to spell out their 
reciprocal metaphysical relation and argue for it, I endorse a commitment to a naturalistically 
                                                
 




respectable framework, broadly conceived.58 Inasmuch as I am concerned with the metaphysics 
of agency and normativity in the remainder of this chapter, and in my distinction of different 
dimensions of agency in the next chapter, these distinctions should be borne in mind.  
 
4.3.2 The Metaphysics of Agency 
An adequate clarification of the metaphysics of constitutive normativity requires us to take a 
step back to Korsgaard’s characterization of the metaphysics of agency—that is, to the claims 
that (i) the function of agency/action is self-constitution, and that (ii) the essential feature of 
action is whole-person attributability/being authored. These two claims can be considered as 
two sides of the same coin (i.e., the Identification Thesis; cf. supra, sections 3.3 n. 36, and 4.2). 
The claim that the essential feature of action is whole-person attributability/being authored 
is, at least prima facie, easily relatable to the Practical Interpretation of constitutive normativity 
sketched above. On one reading, if the essential feature of an action is its attributability, then 
the very concept of action and the normative standards associated with it inherently/necessarily 
involve interaction with other agents and the existence of a practice. Beyond the minimal 
(largely sub-personal and pre-conceptual) sense of agency and self-efficacy associated with 
our interaction with the physical environment, the existence of some other—even if just 
mediated by the use of language or other cultural tools—represents the background of meaning 
against which we can recognize ourselves as agents on the richer conceptual level we are 
concerned with here.59 The constitutive normativity at stake in this case is distinctively social. 
Spelling out the metaphysics of agency in terms of social practices places us in the irreducibly 
normative province of social ontology. Recasting the Identification Thesis through the lenses 
of the Practical Interpretation, I will refer to the second claim as its practical counterpart, or 
ITP.  
How to make sense of the claim that the function of agency is self-constitution in strictly 
metaphysical terms (i.e., the metaphysical counterpart of the Identification Thesis, or ITM), 
without falling into the highly controversial terrain proper to any functional claim invoking 
                                                
 
58 By naturalistic framework I mean a non-reductive methodological naturalism—i.e., the idea that the 
phenomenon at issue is liable to an explanation in thoroughly naturalistic terms—and, in a broader sense, 
the idea that attention should be payed to empirical information about the agents’ situatedness within social 
structures and practices—in other words, the material circumstances of agency.  
59 The claim that the existence of a practice is presupposed—or, in Rawls’ (1955) words, “stage-setting”—
for agency qua social activity is compatible with the possibility of cases of authoring or self-attribution of 




teleological notions, is however, far from straightforward. This is especially true in relation to 
a commitment to naturalistic respectability, with which Korsgaard’s account is admittedly 
supposed to be compatible.60  
The rationale behind the appeal to the notion of function is that it provides a principled way 
for identifying entities. What an entity is, amounts to its functional organization, and its 
functional organization is such that it engenders standards of success and failure 
internal/indigenous to the entity itself. Korsgaard relies on Aristotle’s characterization of living 
things in terms of self-maintaining forms, whose existence depends on their being engaged in 
the very activity of self-maintenance and continuous reproduction of their specific functional 
organization (cf. supra, section 2.5.1).61  
Are the normative standards engendered by self-constitution as the function of action the 
same as those involved in the practice-based constitutive normativity? A practice is a rule- or 
norm-governed activity in which certain behaviors count as fitting and others are out of place. 
In other words, a practice is characterized by normative standards whose violation/deviation 
from the norm warrants a negative evaluation, disqualification/exclusion, or sanction/penalty. 
As mentioned, this kind of normativity seems to be distinctively practical (norms for action) 
(See Glüer & Wikforss (2009/2015, section 1.2) and Rawls (1955) for a characterization of the 
notion of constitutive norms. Cf. supra, section 2.5.2 n. 28). 
In contrast, given that the notion of proper function is appealed to in the attempt to pin down 
the identity conditions of an entity, a violation of those conditions would make it a 
defective/malfunctioning entity, or another kind of entity altogether (norms for being) (cf. 
supra, section 3.1). In this case, the functional organization of an entity sets the conditions for 
its existence and the standards for its evaluation, whose normative character is non-practice-
based, yet seemingly constitutive of agency as well. 
To explore how these different kinds of constitutive normativity interweave into the 
metaphysics of agency, I shall look into the Autonomous Systems Account of functional 
                                                
 
60 For an overview on the lively debate around teleological notions in biology, see Allen (2003). Korsgaard’s 
declaration of compatibility between her defense of teleology and Darwinian approaches can be found in SC 
(section 2.3 “In Defense of Teleology,” see in particular section 2.3.1). See Moreno & Mossio (2015b) for 
a historical reconstruction that traces back to Kant the use of the notion of teleology and purposiveness in 
the “holistic and circular organization of biological systems,” or self-organization, and contextualizes the 
“Kantian-inspired organicist ideas” in the most recent research paradigms in biology. 
61 For Korsgaard’s arguments see SC (section 2.3) “In Defense of Teleology,” and “Aristotle’s Function 




normativity, and use the taxonomy of the varieties of normativity it provides as a framework 
against which some aspects of the constitutive normativity of agency might be tentatively 
understood.  
 
4.4 The Autonomous Systems Account 
Within contemporary debates in the philosophy of biology, the Aristotelian idea of functional 
normativity has seen a resurgence. This is especially the case as it pertains to the organizational 
structure of living systems.62 One such account is the Autonomous Systems Account (ASA) of 
functional normativity.63 The ASA looks at normativity as a pervasive phenomenon “inherent 
in the organization or form of living systems, specifically in the form that generates their unity 
and hence explains their existence” (Christensen, 2012, p. 104). Within this framework, the 
normativity proper to human agency and rationality are grounded in a more basic kind of 
normativity, shared with non-human forms of autonomous systems such as other animals and 
simple biological organisms.  
A system is autonomous when it actively contributes to generate the conditions of its own 
unity and ongoing persistence, by building an infrastructure—a “persistent, relatively stable 
structure that shapes more dynamic system-maintaining processes, with the cell membrane of 
living cells being a paradigm example” (ivi, p. 106). The infrastructure supports and contributes 
to the system’s self-perpetuation, often by playing a regulative role in the organization of the 
system. The autonomy of a system is thus defined as relative to the system as a whole, and in 
relation to the relevant infrastructure (ibid). The resulting functional organization generates 
normative constraints to which the system as a whole is subject. As a consequence, these 
normative constraints represent, minimally, but fundamentally, the conditions that must hold 
in order for the system to exist.  
An autonomous system’s ontology, in turn, is specified by the different levels at which the 
regulative processes and interactions contributing to the system’s existence take place. The 
ontology of complex autonomous systems (like rational agents) is specified in terms of 
“hierarchically structured forms of organization,”—the autonomous system, the cognitive 
                                                
 
62 See Christensen (2012, p. 105 n. 1) for references to the current debate on functional normativity.  
63 Christensen (2012) and Christensen & Bickhard (2002); the present discussion relies on the former. See 





agent, the social individual, the person—“each of which impose normative constraints” (ivi, p. 
110). The system’s ontology generates a normative cascade ranging from fundamental 
persistence norms, up to general agency and cognitive norms, skill domain norms, and 
individual-specific cognitive norms. For example, to be a competent cognitive agent, an agent 
needs working memory, reasoning, and higher order emotional regulation, along with other 
kinds of processes and activities and the associated variety of functional norms. 
In light of the theoretical tools provided by the ASA, the case of human agency can be 
analyzed as follows. Human agents are complex autonomous systems made up of a network of 
interdependent processes (physical, physiological, cognitive, affective, conceptual, 
metacognitive, volitional, social, etc.). There are thus many levels at which human agents’ self-
maintenance/functioning is carried out, and for each level there are specific relations of 
dependence on different kinds of processes and on the relevant infrastructure. 
The consequence of such a view for the first-order constitutivist theory I am concerned with 
is that we are provided with a naturalistically oriented way of cashing out the notion of 
functional organization and its normative character as the source of the unity and existence 
conditions of a living system. Functional normativity in the sense specified by the ASA might 
therefore be a legitimate candidate for understanding the notion of constitutive normativity in 
the non-practice-based sense outlined above (i.e., constitutive norms as norms for being).  
 
4.5 Varieties and Sources of Normativity 
An important feature of the ASA is that it allows us to distinguish between different normative 
perspectives. Specifically, a case is made for conceptualizing normativity as extending beyond 
the realm of rational agency, and admitting of the normative perspective of the autonomous 
systems considered as whole, alongside the normative perspective of individual persons. 
Different kinds of normative evaluation (/normativity) may be thought of as having a parallel 
structure, insofar as the following elements are identifiable:  
a)   a normative perspective (persons, autonomous systems) for which things 
matter,  
b)   the nature/basis of mattering/significance (relevance to the person, 




c)   the mechanism through which entities with normative perspective respond 
to the normative facts constituted by the respective relevance relations 
(rationality, regulation). (Ivi, pp. 108-9)64 
The ASA provides arguments in favor of a naturalist grounding of the normativity of 
personhood and rationality—that is, it aims at providing an explanation of normativity which 
is “consistent with the natural emergence of th[is] phenomen[on]” (Bickhard, 2002, p. 3).65 It 
does so by situating it within the more basic kind of normativity pertaining to autonomous 
systems, addressing therefore the question about the origins of the normativity proper of 
rationality and personhood. The grounding relation between different kinds of normativity 
might be interpreted, however, not just in terms of ‘origins,’ but also of ‘constitution,’ 
according to which,  
persons are not just descended from autonomous agents, they are 
autonomous agents: a person is constituted as a certain kind of autonomous 
agent in the base sense of autonomy, and this makes an important 
contribution to the normativity of personhood. (Christensen, 2012, p. 108) 
The relevance of the ASA for the present purposes is neither in its metanormative 
implications, especially foundationalist ones, nor in the answers it provides to metaphysical 
questions of the relational kind described above (section 4.3.1). Rather, it helps us advance our 
understanding of what the constitutive normativity proper to agency amounts to. 
Gathering treatments of normativity across diverse philosophical literature, the ASA 
distinguishes different kinds of normativity: on the one hand there is descriptive normativity, a 
minimal kind of normativity which refers to the possibility for a system to depart from the 
norm, but does not evaluate nonconformance as ‘bad,’ or ‘wrong.’66  
On the other hand, evaluative normativity involves a comparison between actual and 
alternative states, and comes in different degrees of strength/robustness, corresponding to:  
                                                
 
64 The analysis of the structural features of normative evaluation is based on distinctions drawn by Joseph 
Raz (1999). See the original paper for the references. 
65 Together with Christensen, Bickhard is a major advocate of a naturalistic approach to functional 
normativity, or “natural normativity framework.” In the philosophical tradition, see Philippa Foot’s (2001) 
neo-Aristotelian account of rational and ethical normativity as forms of natural normativity. 





(1)  valuations (axiology): a certain state being ‘good,’ or ‘better/worse than’ 
another; 
(2)  prescriptions (deontic theory): stating how things ‘ought’ to be; 
(3)  constitutive norms: ‘specify rules which must hold if something is to exist;’ 
‘are per se non-evaluative, though they can inform evaluations in 
conjunction with other information, such as an agreement (perhaps tacit) 
to play by the rules’—usually involving ‘paradigmatic performance 
norms.’ (Ivi, p. 105) 
The rich taxonomy of normativity delineated by the ASA, along with the generic structural 
features shared by different kinds of normative evaluation, provide us with a basic set of 
theoretical tools to solve some of the difficulties met in providing a coherent interpretation of 
Korsgaard’s attempt to bring together metaphysical and psychological aspects of normativity. 
After this detour on the metaphysics of normativity, I shall provide a provisional 
characterization of constitutive normativity and its heterogeneity.  
 
4.6 Constitutive Normativity, regained 
Agency has a dual nature, roughly paralleling the nature-nurture debate: it is in part due to our 
social practices, and in part to our biological, cognitive, and psychological constitution—our 
being autonomous agents in the terms specified by the ASA. The constitutive norms pertaining 
to agency can therefore be thought of as having a parallel dual nature: socially generated, or 
practice-based constitutive normativity, and non-practice-based constitutive normativity.  
While a full exploration of the distinction between natural and social roots of (constitutive) 
normativity exceeds the possibility of adequate exploration here, it is worth pointing to some 
recent work by Katharina Nieswandt (2016) that might help clarify some of the points I am 
making. By providing a compelling interpretation of G. E. M. Anscombe’s writings, Nieswandt 
sets the stage for the development of a rich and coherent Anscombean metaethical framework, 
grounded on the distinction between two kinds of necessity. Specifically, she draws on 
Anscombe’s distinction between a “practice-internal or ‘conventional’ necessity” (i.e., “the 
necessity imposed by a rule, a right or a promise”), and a “practice-external or ‘Aristotelian’ 
necessity,” according to which human goods, or standards for human flourishing, are grounded 
in human nature.  
Nieswandt’s elaboration of the Anscombean framework is interesting for present purposes 
because it is yet another approach aimed at elucidating how different kinds of norms—i.e., 




practical, legal, ethical, etc.)—equally pertain/contribute to the constitution of distinctive kinds 
of entities such as human agents. In particular, it is the individuation of the specificity of the 
practice-internal, or conventional necessity, that is relevant here, as I arrive at similar 
conclusions while drawing from a different theoretical approach (section 4.6.2). In line with 
the Anscombean distinction between two kinds of necessity, my proposal is therefore meant to 
be noncommittal about metaethical and evaluatively normative issues. My aim, once again, is 
to provide an elucidation of the notion of constitutive normativity relevant for a first-order 
constitutivist theory of agency.   
 
4.6.1 Non-Practice-Based Constitutive Normativity 
How does the ASA relate to the constitutivist theory of agency I am concerned with here? 
Insofar as we consider agents as autonomous systems—which represent one possible 
normative perspective from which we can consider an agent’s ontology—the norms governing 
the different processes (physiological, psychological, cognitive) contributing to the system’s 
functional organization are constitutive in that they represent the unity and existence conditions 
for the system considered as a whole. This is a first, non-practice-based way of interpreting 
constitutive normativity, which amounts to functional normativity as specified by the ASA. 
Since the characterization of an autonomous system constitutively incorporates a reference 
to the infrastructure utilized by the system for its self-maintenance, the wholeness of the system 
and its identity are possible just against the background of the infrastructure and circumstances 
sustaining it. Given the processual and dynamic character of a system’s functional 
organization, a human agent qua autonomous system, is an inherently dynamic entity, which 
actively contributes to its own constitution. Being an agent and exercising agency amounts to 
being engaged in processes and activities in interaction with a rich infrastructure. I am 
following here an important conceptual distinction operated by theorists of biological 
autonomy, who identify 
two interrelated, and yet conceptually distinct, dimensions of biological 
autonomy: the constitutive one, which largely determines the identity of the 
system; and the interactive one, which, far from being a mere side effect of 
the constitutive dimension, deals with the inherent functional interactions 
that the organisms must maintain with the environment. These two 
dimensions are intimately related and equally necessary. […] In particular, 
the emphasis on the interactive dimension implies […] that autonomy should 
not be confused with independence: an autonomous system must interact 




grounds the agential dimension of autonomy. (Moreno & Mossio, 2015b, p. 
xxviii) 
The interpretation of the ITM that I am favoring here understands agency as an activity of 
self-constitution which is inherently situated and interactive, thereby providing a footing for 
the Interaction Claim advanced in chapter three. A consequence of this interpretation, then, 
would be that it is a matter of constitutive normativity in a non-practice-based sense—i.e., 
independently from any sort of necessity established within the practice itself, or by it—, that 
human beings socially organize themselves, and act in the context of practices they themselves 
create/establish. The kind of necessity associated with non-practice-based constitutive 
normativity would be something analogous to the necessity of natural-historical judgments, or 
‘Aristotelian categoricals’ (or Aristotelian necessity, in Anscombe’s sense), of the form “The 
S is/has/does F,” and “S’s do F” (Thompson, 2008, Foot, 2001). 
Human agency is thus constitutively social, in that social structures and practices are not just 
metaphysically (/logically) prior to individual agency, but also empirically and practically 
necessary to it, as they provide the material and interactive conditions for individual self-
awareness and selfhood. There is in fact a consistent body of empirical evidence (coming from 
clinical, cognitive, developmental psychology, as well as neurophysiology) supporting the 
hypothesis of a close interdependence between human subjectivity, and the embodied and 
interpersonal dimensions of human cognition and meta-cognition, which informs rich strands 
of research in philosophy of mind and action.67  
 
4.6.2 Socially-Generated Constitutive Normativity 
For human beings, kind-membership to agency has both natural and social roots. As 
autonomous systems and cognizers, human beings are born with agential capacities that are 
actualized and operated in the context of relationships (material, interpersonal, social), and 
have effects (physical, psychological, cognitive, normative) on their environment (natural and 
social), on themselves, and others. As stated in the Agential Responsibility Claim, the notion 
of an agent is inherently relational. Agents constitute themselves qua social individuals, within 
social practices and interactions. 
                                                
 
67 Among these there are phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness (see Gallagher & Zahavi 
(2005/2014) for an overview, Pacherie (2013) for the specific case of collective action), and for embodied 
and social cognition see Wilson & Foglia (2011/2015) and de Bruin et al. (2012), respectively. Cf. Meini 




Human agency as the activity of self-constitution (keeping Korsgaard’s central claim, in its 
practical counterpart ITP) takes therefore the form of concrete, embodied, situated social 
practices—crucially, through conceptually mediated practices of self- and other-ascriptions,68 
which carry further, discursively and socially-generated normativity. Socially-generated 
normativity ranges from the norms governing acts of promising, commanding, consenting, 
pardoning, etc., to actions requiring more complex and structured social institutions, such as 
voting, marrying, and baptizing—all of which have normative states of affairs (consisting of 
commitments, rights, obligations, licenses, etc.) associated with their performance. 
By socially-generated constitutive normativity, I mean the normative dimension associated 
with human practices, which in the next chapter (section 5.4) I will refer to as the performative 
dimension of agency. The performative dimension of agency is roughly modelled on the 
performative dimension of language as characterized in Speech Act Theory (SAT) developed 
within the philosophy of language (Austin, 1962/1975, Searle, 1969, Sbisà, 2002, 2007), and 
beyond, notably by feminist philosophers in a social account of language use (Hornsby, 1995, 
Kukla, 2014, to name just a few).  
A ‘speech act’ (or ‘illocutionary act’) is a term of art that refers to the “performance of an 
act in saying something as opposed to the performance of an act of saying something” (Austin 
1962/1975, pp. 99-100), thereby pointing out that language is used not just to describe how 
things are, but to do things:  
The use of language is a sort of social action, consisting of the production 
and reception of utterances. People do things with words—this is action; and 
(though this may at first seem a strange way to put it) they do things to one 
another—this is social action: They tell one another things, or ask them 
things, or try to persuade them of things, or whatever. (Hornsby, 1995, pp. 
129-130) 
As such, the term ‘performative’ refers to the production of normative states of affairs—
“that is, states consisting of the conjunction or disjunction of an agent with a modal predicate 
belonging to the deontic kind” (Sbisà, 2013, p. 32)—associated with the performance of speech 
acts qua social actions. By extension, and more broadly, with the term ‘performative’ I refer to 
                                                
 
68 See Thalos & Andreou (2009), for an evolutionary informed account of the distinctiveness of homo 
sapiens as a bonding species—i.e., capable of collective agency. Bonding, the authors claim, is a “universal 
of mammalian life.” They emphasize the hyper-sociality of our species to indicate how cooperation, rather 




the acts of doing or omitting to do something, generally identifiable by means of the specific 
changes/effects/outcomes in the agent’s environment that their performance brings about.69 
The normativity proper to the performative dimension of agency is socially-generated and 
conventional in that it is associated with the production of conventional effects. These effects 
are “made possible by the social frame and brought about thanks to the kind of agreement 
between [interactors] about what is being done, which we may call uptake,” and the mark of 
their conventionality is their “defeasibility,” i.e., “the liability to being annulled in particular 
circumstances” (Sbisà, 2014, pp. 621-622).70 
This kind of socially-generated normativity is constitutive in the sense that the activities 
governed by constitutive norms do not exist apart from those very norms. In Korsgaard’s 
descriptive-cum-normative sense of the term, the activities are at once defined, or constituted, 
and regulated by them (cf. supra, sections 4.3.2 n. 59, and 2.5.2). By illuminating their 
defeasible character—i.e., that their constitutive function “is only exercised against a 
background of intersubjective agreement” (Sbisà, forthcoming, section 1)—the speech-act-
theoretical analysis endorsed here is a good candidate for understanding the practice-based 
(yet non-moral) counterpart of constitutive normativity that emerged from the Practical 
Interpretation advanced above (section 4.2.3).  
In my view, the gist of a constitutivist theory of agency consists in an explanation of the 
complex organization of processes and practices by means of which human agents can 
recognize themselves as inherently autonomous, yet social entities. In other words, as 
individuals occupying the characteristic first-personal (singular and plural) agential perspective 
of deliberating and evaluating agents, who are autonomous in a distinct manner, richer than the 
biological sense of the term, and therefore closer to Korsgaard’s use. Such a project is grounded 
in an elucidation of how different kinds of normativity hold together, and the present work is 
meant to produce a first step in that direction. 
 
                                                
 
69 For the distinction between behavior and performance (negative and positive) in an Austinian framework, 
see Ginocchietti (2016). Generally speaking, the ‘problem’ of action individuation necessarily points to 
broader issues of social ontology, which, however, deserve an investigation of their own.  
70 For an alternative interpretation of the conventionality of speech acts—in terms of conventionality of the 
(semantic) means by which they are performed, rather than their effects—see Searle (1969). The distinction 





In this chapter I have analyzed Korsgaard’s characterization of constitutive norms by providing 
three possible ways to interpret it. I have endorsed the Practical Interpretation—based on 
Korsgaard’s own practical account of responsibility—as the best candidate to account for, at 
least in principle, the conclusions drawn in chapter three. There I made a case for considering 
cases of alleged defective agents as genuinely exercising agency, and concluded that the 
constitutive normativity proper to agency does not per se entail the normativity of morality. 
Here, I advanced the claim that Korsgaard’s criteria for agency, if we look at the phenomenon 
of agency in merely individual psychological terms, are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
capturing why those cases legitimately count as genuine instances of agency. As we will see in 
the next chapter (section 5.2.1), even highlighting the social aspects of Korsgaard’s account 
will not be enough to overcome those objections. Taken together, this means that there is room 
for an understanding of constitutive normativity/norms of agency in practical, yet non-moral, 
terms.  
While giving prominence to norms of practical reasoning, the Practical Interpretation also 
pointed out that constitutive normativity is not exhausted by them. Insofar as exercising agency 
means participating into social practices, there are other sorts of norms (notably, social norms 
such as those governing the social meaning of actions) which might qualify as constitutive of 
agency, just as norms of practical reasoning do. 
Under the hypothesis of an indigenous variety of constitutive norms/normativity, I turned to 
what I identified as the core of Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory—the Identification Thesis—
to understand what notion of constitutive normativity it relies on. I first focused on the 
metaphysical counterpart of the Identification Thesis, or ITM (as opposed to its practical 
counterpart, or ITP)—that is, Korsgaard’s appeal to the functional claim that the function of 
action is to constitute the one who exercises it/performs it into a unified agent. I introduced the 
Autonomous Systems Account (ASA) of functional normativity, and suggested that functional 
normativity—i.e., as the unity and existence conditions for a system’s self-maintenance and 
development in connection with its infrastructure—be considered as a non-practice-based 
variety of constitutive normativity.  
As to the ITP, I spelled out a socially-generated or practice-based variety of constitutive 
normativity, modelled after the normativity proper to the performance of speech acts qua social 
actions as specified by Speech Act Theory (SAT). This preliminary specification of the 




rely for my proposal in the next chapter, where I also provide a reframing of agency which 
positively accounts for the Disorders and Displacement scenarios and elaborates on the 





Chapter Five – Reframing Agency 
 
The moral drawn from the discussion of the Disorders and Displacement cases is that a 
conceptualization of human agency that focuses on the individual psychology of agents allows 
us to capture just one aspect of the phenomenon. The central thesis advanced in this work is 
that agency should be conceived of as a complex and interactive capacity, and that the exercise 
of this capacity, at any degree and stage of actualization, crucially depends on interpersonal 
relationships and contextual factors. As such, an account of agency limited to individual 
psychology is incomplete. This thesis found an early expression in chapter three with my 
proposal to complement Korsgaard’s theory with the Interaction Claim, which helps to make 
sense of the intuitions and reasons provided in favor of considering those scenarios as cases in 
which agency is, to different extents and despite adverse contextual circumstances, exercised. 
In this chapter I clarify the relationship between the practical counterpart of the Identification 
Thesis (ITP), the Agential Responsibility Claim, and the Interaction Claim introduced in chapter 
three. My aim is to advance an account of the constitution of agency that improves upon 
Korsgaard’s own authorship view of agency and action. I do so by combining G. E. M. 
Anscombe’s characterization of intentional action with the theoretical notion of selective 
intersubjective recognition, in order to focus on the role played by the practices of holding 
people responsible (and the distortions thereof), and those of identity-ascriptions, in the 
exercise of agency. Although the conceptual distinctions operated and the theoretical tools 
adopted here represent a departure from Korsgaard’s framework, they have the potential to 
elucidate how a strengthening of her practical (vs. metaphysical) approach to responsibility 
and agency might be further developed within a first-order constitutivist theory of agency 
inspired by her own account; or so I will argue. Accordingly, I will conclude by presenting the 
central components of my reframing and expansion of Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory of 
agency and authorship view. 
 
5.1 Central Components of My Reframing 
With the preliminary clarification of the metaphysics of agency and normativity conducted in 
the previous chapter in place, I shall now proceed to articulate the building blocks for the 
reframing of the first-order level constitutivist theory of agency that I am pursuing. First of all, 




introduced in chapter one. There, I provided a rough characterization of agency as the capacity 
exercised/manifested by agents when they do something. The sense of doing something 
relevant to capturing the specificity of human agency is customarily contrasted with 
happenings in the world, and the outward performance of merely (non-actional) bodily 
movements of an agent (e.g. reflexes, spasms). According to the standard conception of action 
and agency in the philosophy of action,71 someone is an agent if she manifests the capacity to 
act intentionally and for reasons. While fitting in with the standard conception outlined in 
chapter one, some important differences are worth highlighting. 
 
5.1.1 The Necessity of a Scalar Approach 
Korsgaard’s construal of the connection between intentional and rational agency is quite 
strong. Her Kantian account of intentional action takes rational action to be “the only genuine 
kind of intentional action” (Arruda, 2016a, section 1.1; SC, sections 1.4.8, 3.1.1, 9.7.6). While 
acknowledging that the notion of agency comes in degrees,72 her intellectualist account of 
intentional action, combined with an interpretation of the Identification Thesis along 
metaphysical lines (cf. supra, sections 3.1, 3.3-3.5, 4.3), engendered the problem of defective 
actions. For Korsgaard, defective actions fail to fully unify their performer; they reflect 
negatively on, or transmit failure to, the agent’s status itself by making her ‘ineffective,’ and 
‘less of an agent.’ The core of her account is that agency requires unification, which in turn 
demands quite a lot from the individual agent’s psychology in terms of the development of 
higher-order capacities for rational self-reflection and practical deliberation. In sum, 
Korsgaard’s account sets the standards for genuine agency quite high in terms of agential 
capacities.73  
Despite the high standards Korsgaard sets, her inclusion of a scalar approach is necessary 
lest incorrect lines be drawn demarcating agents and non-agents. Incorrectly identifying 
someone as a non-agent has obvious moral implications. As such, leaving flexibility in who 
may be counted among the set of agents by allowing agents to be more or less genuine/full 
                                                
 
71 As we saw, the two claims around which the standard conception of agency and action revolves around 
are that (1) the notion of action is to be explained in terms of intentional action, and that (2) there is a close 
relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason. Cf. supra, section 1.1.1. 
72 SC (section 8.5.1): “the extent to which one is unified, and so is an agent, is a matter of degree.” 
73 See Arruda (ms.) for a critique of the widespread tendency among theories of agency of different 




agents, is necessary. Generally, I use the term ‘scalar’ to point to the fluidity between the 
notions of absent and ideal agency, without intending an ability to derive any precise 
measurement between the two.  
One of the tasks for a full elaboration of such approach might be to provide indications for 
the individuation of certain threshold levels of agential capacities (e.g., absent, minimal, full, 
ideal, etc.). Although undertaking this task is beyond the scope of the present work, the 
reference in the Agential Responsibility Claim I introduced in chapter three (cf. supra, section 
3.4),74 to the agential capacities in terms of graded notions, is meant to start responding to the 
necessity of a scalar approach.  
In light of the argument built up throughout this work—i.e., that being held in interpersonal 
relationships and participating in practices of accountability for actions is constitutive of what 
makes an agent an agent, at any degree of development and actualization of an agent’s agential 
capacities—I will argue that the scalar notion of agency extends well beyond the psychic 
unification of an agent and into other considerations such as recognition and intention (infra, 
section 5.5). 
In my reframed account, the possession, to some degree, of these agential capacities and the 
exercise of such form of control in the appropriate relational contexts will be considered as 
necessary conditions for agency, but no commitment is made to the realization of such 
capacities to the highest degree. This marks an important shift of focus in the development of 
a scalar approach, in that regardless of the degree at which the agential capacities (and possibly 
agential unification) might be realized, the distinctive feature of intentional actions that such 
capacities point to is their liability to a characteristic form of agential control, such that the 
agent can legitimately be intersubjectively recognized as their author.  
 
5.1.2 Relationality 
The Disorders scenario showed that participation in interpersonal relationships—i.e., being 
recognized and treated as a participant into practices of accountability—is a necessary 
condition for an agent to successfully exercise their agential capacities, and plausibly to even 
develop them in the first place. This consideration lead to the second and most prominent 
component of my reframing: relationality. I phrased the Agential Responsibility Claim to give 
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special prominence to the relational aspect of agency. While the possession of the relevant 
agential capacities figures as a presumption informing the practice of responsibility ascription, 
the focal point of the claim is the relational definition of what it is to be an agent. To be an 
agent, so the claim goes, is to be a participant in a network of interpersonal relationships and 
practices of accountability for one’s actions.  
In Korsgaard’s account, the dialogical character of normative reasons—i.e., that a properly 
normative reason must be shareable and essentially public75—and the relational notion of 
responsibility as answerability are the elements that are meant to ensure/secure the social 
dimension of the activity of self-constitution. For Korsgaard, relationality and the social 
dimension of agency enter the picture with the relations of reciprocity and mutual 
accountability that the already extant agent enters in when exchanging reasons and engaging 
in practical deliberation (in isolation and with others). For me the practice itself is a key element 
for understanding agency in the first place. An agent is constituted with others. In other words, 
on my account agency itself is constituted in the shared space where the authoring of intentional 
actions (more or less reasoned) gets recognition by the relevant participants in the practices of 
exchanging reasons and accountability for actions. 
 
5.1.3 Context-Sensitivity and Situatedness 
According to Korsgaard, attributability is the distinctive feature of human actions, and the 
authorship view she proposes is meant to account precisely for this feature. In a nutshell, a 
certain kind of psychological constitution—which, in Korsgaard’s view, is the result of the 
agent’s successful engagement in practical reasoning—must be in place in order for her actions 
to be authored. The relation of authorship between an agent and her intentional actions 
emerging from Korsgaard’s account has it that actions are a self-determined and efficacious 
expression of self. In this way, actions are attributable to the agents who have authored them, 
and authorship depends on the psychological structure of the agent allowing for morally and 
rationally coherent self-unification (cf. Arruda, 2016a, section 1.1).  
                                                
 
75 Note that Korsgaard’s is a Kantian conception of the normativity of reasons, which she defends also by 
appealing to Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’ for the essential publicity of meaning. Even though 
my concern in this work is not a discussion of the sources of the normativity of practical reasons, it should 
be noted that the Kantian is just but one position on the issue, which is also related to the question regarding 
the variety of reasons for action, beyond normative ones. For an overview on the distinction between 
normative, motivating, and explanatory reasons see Alvarez (2016). For a discussion of the shareability issue 




However, as the discussion of the Displacement case has shown, successfully carrying out 
the process of self-constitution at the reflective level (the one relevant for Korsgaard’s 
characterization of intentional action), is not sufficient for bringing about the action as intended 
by the agent. We need to look ‘outside’ the agent, into the features of the actual context in 
which the action is performed.  
According to Bierria’s explanation of the Displacement cases, it is not just that certain 
actions get attributed to an agent, independently of, or despite, the agent’s actual intentions. In 
the situations described by Bierria, the social reading of the actions performed by 
disenfranchised agents is such that it systematically trumps the agents’ ability to act as they 
intend in the social sphere. In conditions of oppression and discrimination the characteristic 
first-personal relation of authoring between an agent and her intentional actions gets hijacked, 
resulting in a distortion of the agent’s intentions, and the process of authoring of the actions is 
displaced from the agent actually performing them.  
The conclusion I draw from Bierria’s characterization and discussion of the phenomenon of 
the ‘social authoring’ of an action, is that it points to the inherently context-sensitive and 
situated character of agency. The authoring process of an action is dependent on the features 
and specific dynamics of the context in which the agential capacities are exercised, as well as 
to the agent’s position/status with respect to the broader social environment in which she acts. 
Social categories and structures (including systems of oppression and discrimination) are also 
internalized, to the effect that the social perspectives on us as particular historically and socially 
situated agents are also acted on, producing the distinctively psychological harms of negatively 
affecting the agents’ own sense of self-efficacy and motivation. 
Psychological research on internal motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000) points to three factors 
involved in the development of an agent’s integrated sense of self, volition, and initiative, as 
well as her wellbeing experience and the quality of her performance. These are the individual’s 
experience of autonomy, competence, and relatedness, corresponding to the psychological 
needs of feeling agentic, effective, and connected to others. 
Put concisely, agency is dependent on intersubjective recognition, which might range from 
being thoroughly affirmative to deeply distorting. I should emphasize that in my reframing the 
notion of recognition76 is not a theoretical tool to help extrapolate the individual’s intention in 
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acting, but an empirical necessity in the very process of constitution of our agency. In addition 
to the Agential Responsibility Claim, I therefore suggested that the reframing of the 
constitutivist theory of agency include the Interaction Claim, according to which agency is 
constitutively a function of the agent’s location within a network of social and interpersonal 
relationships, as well as of the quality of those relationships, as perceived by the agent herself.  
However, in agreement with Bierria’s interpretation of the Displacement case, in chapter 
three I concluded that even if the inherent context-sensitivity and situatedness of agency makes 
it liable to the phenomenon of social authoring, there is no denial of agency. The intersubjective 
recognition necessary for genuine agency seems therefore to be selective. In other words, you 
are not an agent because everyone recognizes you as such, you are an agent because at least 
some people, in the relevant interpersonal relationships and groups, recognize you as such. The 
context-sensitive and situated character of agency, then, provides the theoretical resources for 
accounting for the selectiveness hypothesis I advance here. 
Postulating the dependence of agency on selective intersubjective recognition is compatible 
with Bierria’s proposal to adopt a heterogeneous framework of agency, which allows us to 
distinguish between different kinds of agency, such as transformative, alien, and insurgent: 
“Transformative agency” might cover action intended to fundamentally 
overturn conditions of systematic oppression, especially (but not 
exclusively) through collective action, such as through community 
organizing, movement building, or political advocacy. […] 
Alien agency facilitates action that intentionally creates meaning apart from 
dominant structures of oppression and the people who endorse them. […] 
Alien agentic action does not seek to transform systemic conditions of 
oppression, but is resistant in that it facilitates action that is preoccupied with 
cultivating its own universe of meaning and practice that affirms that which 
is unvalued—in this case, black life—and is therefore ambivalent about or 
even encourages its illegibility within the dominant public sphere. […] 
Insurgent agency is employed by subjects who intentionally act in unstable 
and precarious circumstances that are difficult to escape or alter, and who 
craft provisional and makeshift practices of opposition that subvert, but still 
                                                
 
tradition, e.g. Sbisà (2007, 2009), especially by Hornsby (1995), who highlights the role this notion plays in 
the pragmatic dynamics of silencing and other forms of speech disempowering and conversational injustice 
(see also Kukla (2014), Ayala & Vasilyeva (2016). Arruda (2016b) develops an account of what mutual 




remain defined by, conditions of power. […] This kind of agency, this hustle, 
is not usually celebrated as an idealized model of liberatory action, but it is 
a kind of intentional action that requires imagination and strategic thinking, 
and that is accessible for use in circumstances in which one is isolated and 
has few options. (Bierria, 2014, pp. 139-141) 
The necessity of recognizing different kinds of agency comes, in my view, as a corollary of 
the Interaction Claim. By considering context-sensitivity and situatedness as constitutive 
features of agency we can explain why denial of agency by ‘non-affiliated others’ usually (and 
luckily) misfires,77 and make sense of the variety of ways in which agents can and do act and 
organize despite adverse social, historical, and political conditions, and eventually subvert 
them.  
At the same time, by looking at agents in broader contexts and conditions in which they 
operate, an approach centered on the social constitution of agency like the one I am proposing 
forces us to consider macro-phenomena such as power structures—which are usually opaque 
to approaches that focus on the individual agential standpoint78—as the background 
architecture that both constrains and enables agency.  
So far so good, as to an outline of the central components of my reframing of Korsgaard’s 
constitutivist theory of agency. All of this, however, still leaves the substance of the notions of 
intentional action and its connection to the Identity Thesis indefinite, which I shall address in 
the following sections. Although we cannot rely on Korsgaard’s account of intentional action 
for the reasons I have outlined here and in chapter three, the characterization provided by G. 
E. M. Anscombe can be used to help explicate how constitutive features of agency such as 
relationality and context-sensitivity relate to the notions of (first-personal) agential standpoint 
and agential authority. Anscombe’s account also helps us flesh out some of the scalar aspects 
of first-person and attributed intentionality. 
 
5.2 Anscombe on Intentional Action 
According to G. E. M. Anscombe, intentional actions are those “to which a certain sense of the 
question ‘Why?’ is given application”—the relevant sense being “that in which the answer, if 
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positive, gives a reason for acting” (Anscombe, 1957/2000, p. 9). The term ‘intentional,’ 
Anscombe claims, does not involve any mental state/event or interior act (ivi, pp. 2, 8-9, 36, 
49) nor an extra-feature (ivi, pp. 28-9) accompanying the agent’s behavior. Rather, it “has 
reference to a form of description of events” (ivi, p. 84). More specifically, among the several 
possible descriptions of a person’s bodily movements, what counts as her actions are those 
individuated by the ‘descriptions under which’ she knows what she is doing: “it is the agent’s 
knowledge of what [s]he is doing that gives the descriptions under which what is going on is 
the execution of an intention” (ivi, p. 87). 
The kinds of answers by means of which the ‘Why?’ question is given or refused application 
reveal important features of the notion of intentional action. For example, answers mentioning 
some future state of affairs (‘I am doing A in order to do B’), or wider descriptions of what one 
is doing (‘I am doing A because I am doing B’), reveal the progressive, or imperfective, 
character of action and its teleological/explanatory structure (ivi, pp. 45-7),79 respectively. By 
refusing application to the ‘Why?’ question, answers like ‘I was not aware I was doing that,’ 
and ‘I observed I was doing that’ shed light on the self-conscious character of intentional action, 
and on the non-observational and non-evidential character of the kind of knowledge it consists 
in. 
On the other hand, Anscombe states that answers like ‘I just thought I would’ or ‘It was an 
impulse’ or ‘For no particular reason’ or ‘It was an idle action —I was just doodling’ are not a 
rejection of the question: “The question is not refused application because the answer to it says 
that there is no reason, any more than the question of how much money I have in my pocket is 
refused application by the answer ‘None’” (ivi, p. 25). This flexibility shows that an agent may 
be more or less aware of the intentions behind their actions. Some may be fully conscious, 
deliberate, and complexly reasoned. Others, not. All, however, count as intentional actions. 
Following Aquinas, Anscombe defines the kind of knowledge an agent has of her intentional 
actions as practical knowledge, which is importantly contrasted with speculative knowledge in 
that the former is “the cause of what it understands,” while the latter is derived from the object 
known. Practical knowledge is distinctively “exercised in the action” and is the formal cause 
of the agent’s intentional actions, in the sense that “without it what happens does not come 
under the description—execution of intentions” (ivi, pp. 84, 87-89). By acting intentionally, “I 
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do what happens. That is to say, when the description of what happens is the very thing which 
I should say I was doing, then there is no distinction between my doing and the thing’s 
happening” (ivi, pp. 52-53).  
 
5.3 Relevance of the Anscombean Approach to Intentional Action for the 
Present Work 
The exegesis of Anscombe’s characterization of intentional action in terms of practical 
knowledge, and the elaborations thereon, are complex and thriving (see Ford, Hornsby, & 
Stoutland, 2011). However, for present purposes a quite general highlighting of some of its 
central insights will suffice.  
Anscombe provides a distinctively non-reductive,80 outward-looking81 (Anscombe, 
1957/2000, pp. 9, 49) approach to intentional action. ‘Intentional’ does not stand for any mental 
states accompanying the action; rather, it is a formal category,82 as it marks a description of 
events. At the same time, her account of intentional action is agent-centered. Any intentional 
action is given ‘under a description’ (ivi, pp. 52-3),83 and indeed there might be several 
descriptions for an action. The relevant description, however, is fixed by directly addressing 
the agent for an explanation of her action.84 The description under which an action counts as 
intentional is the one under which the agent knows what she is doing, which brings to the fore 
“the agent’s specific understanding of the structure of an action-in-progress” (Lavin, 2016, p. 
624), and hence the self-conscious and distinctively first-personal character of intentional 
action. In the displacement case, no agent was asked about their intentions before producing 
                                                
 
80 In the sense that the account of intentional action she provides does not reduce it to mental states of the 
individual agent. Cf. supra, section 1.1.2. 
81 The distinction between inward-looking and outward-looking approaches to agency is Stout’s (2005). Cf. 
also Stoutland (2011, pp. 24, 28). 
82 See Thompson (2008) and Lavin (2016) for a development of this Anscombean idea within a Fregean 
logical infrastructure, into the project of an ‘analytical Aristotelianism.’ 
83 Note that Anscombe’s ‘under-a-description’ condition for action individuation is very different from 
Davidson’s, despite having been often associated with it. Emphasizing this difference is important as it 
reflects deeper differences in methods and approaches to action/agency in their equally pioneering work; so 
much that they are customarily seen as the initiators of two distinct strands or traditions in the philosophy of 
action. For Anscombe’s own stand on this issue see her (1979). 
84 The scenarios in Anscombe’s examples are always ‘personal’, see Lavin (2016, pp. 623-624): “we are 
asked to imagine the agent herself being asked ‘Why?’ about the action underway;” “Anscombe’s question 
‘Why?’ is characteristically posed to some ‘you,’ someone who would answer with a sentence beginning 




the opposing headlines. The reporters’ inability to address the agents also highlights the fact 
that only a select few can be in a position to address the agent for an explanation, which 
coincides with my characterization of agency as selective intersubjective recognition. 
Importantly, Anscombe describes the kind of understanding an agent has of her own 
intentional action as practical, arguably in (at least)85 the following twofold sense. First, in that 
the agent’s conscious awareness of her action plays a crucial role in practically orienting her 
throughout the execution of the relevant action (Pickard, 2004). The ‘agential awareness’—
articulated by the agent in response to the Why?-question, typically in the form of a means-end 
order such as ‘I am doing A because I am doing B,’ or ‘I am doing A in order to do B’—is “an 
awareness that does not merely record but determines the order, and thus the progress, it 
comprehends” (Lavin, 2016, p. 622). Second, in a stronger sense, the agent’s knowledge of her 
intentional actions is practical in that the potential for rational control that the agent has over 
them puts her in a (normatively) practical relation of ‘agential authority’ with respect to them 
(Moran, 2001, 2004; Bagnoli, 2007, 2013).  
Both features of intentional action—availability to conscious awareness, and susceptibility 
to rational control, justification, and practical deliberation—are central to the understanding of 
agential capacities relied on in the Agential Responsibility Claim, and represent a significant 
point of continuity with Korsgaard’s account.86 However, beyond Korsgaard’s suggestions,87 
Anscombe’s account encourages the hypothesis of understanding intentional actions, along 
with actions of cognate species such as merely voluntary actions, on the one hand, and actions 
done for reasons, on the other, as structured on a spectrum of increasingly complex cognitive 
capacities and degrees of availability to the agent’s conscious control (see Levy, 2013). 
Anscombe’s emphasis on the immediacy and authority proper to the practical kind of 
knowledge the agent has of her intentional actions (cf. Moran, 2001) importantly speaks to 
                                                
 
85 This is not meant to be an investigation into Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge. Such investigation 
has been conducted, among others, by Moran (2004), Rödl (2011), Schwenkler (2015). 
86 One important difference between the two is Korsgaard’s explicit aversion to the notion of practical 
knowledge. For a reconstruction and discussion of Korsgaard’s arguments against the notion of ‘applied 
knowledge’ see Bagnoli (2013, pp. 156-160). Bagnoli proposes a ‘return to Anscombe’ and defends a form 
of practical cognitivism out of Anscombe’s account of practical knowledge within the framework of Kantian 
metaethical constructivism—i.e., practical knowledge is understood as the “knowledge of oneself as a 
practical subject.”  
87 SC (sections 5.4.7 and 6.1.3). Korsgaard’s focus, however, is on different kinds of action and agency as 
displayed by human and non-human agents. Therefore, the criticism that her account is unduly committed 
to consider human actions that fall short of rationality as less than full-fledged actions, and that her account 




both the commonsense and the philosophical understanding of the centrality of the agential 
standpoint in explaining the phenomenon of human agency. As a consequence, one of the main 
tendencies in the current literature has been to interpret Anscombe’s characterization of 
practical knowledge in terms of a form of self-knowledge.88 
In partial departure from this tendency, my elaboration on Anscombe’s work is meant to 
emphasize instead her distinctive attempt at providing an outward-looking characterization of 
intentional action (cf. Stout, 2005) which keeps the agent center stage, without restricting the 
focus to her individual psychology. Specifically, my aim is to shift the focus from the 
competences and capacities required for agency, to the broader context of the external and 
intersubjective conditions involved in the processes of authoring of an action. With the 
Anscombean picture of intentional action in place, I shall now proceed to lay out my 
reconceptualization of the constitution of agency. 
 
5.4 Dimensions of Agency 
To begin with some analytical clarity, I distinguish three different dimensions of human 
agency: psychological, cognitive, and performative. In introducing these distinctions, it is 
important to emphasize that, qua theoretical distinctions, they are not supposed to be 
explanatorily exhaustive categories to understand the phenomenon of human agency, but rather 
useful tools to analyze some aspects of its complexity in theoretical isolation/abstraction from 
each other.89  
By the psychological dimension of human agency, I refer to the psychological processes and 
sub-personal mechanisms underlying the performance and (sub-agentive) control of an action, 
on the one hand, and to the personal-level experience of intentional actions available to the 
agent’s agential awareness, on the other.  
Empirical studies on the role of consciousness in the initiation and control of actions 
investigate the hypothesis of a sub-personal psychological system, the so-called ‘comparator 
                                                
 
88 For an example of how the idea of practical knowledge as a form of self-knowledge has been developed 
along very different directions in the literature, compare the works by David Velleman (reductive 
cognitivism about practical knowledge), Richard Moran (constitutivism about practical knowledge), and 
Carla Bagnoli (practical cognitivism).  
89 The methodological assumption guiding this distinction is that an investigation into each dimension 
separately from the overall explanation of their reciprocal connection, and, broadly speaking, from 
addressing relational questions, metaphysically speaking (see supra, section 4.3.1), is a worthwhile 




model of motor control.’ According to several studies (Frith et al., 2000, Haggard, 2005, Bayne 
& Pacherie, 2007, Pacherie, 2008, 2011), that system is partially responsible for the distinctive 
phenomenology of agency, or the sense the agent has that she is the author of her actions. These 
inquiries are meant to shed light on the complex workings of agency, characterized by the 
interplay between the agent’s conscious awareness and rational control, and sub-personal 
processes. 
In other words, I take the term ‘psychological’ to apply to the self-conscious dimension 
distinctive of human subjectivity and phenomenological experience, independently of the 
degree of conscious awareness and cognitive penetrability on the part of the agent’s higher 
level cognitive and meta-cognitive capacities. 
The cognitive dimension is distinct from, but functions as a bridge between, the 
psychological and performative. It encompasses an agent’s non-conceptual (procedural) 
capacities for regulation and monitoring of her own mental processes and bodily actions 
(Proust, 2010),90 for directed attention, as well as higher order conceptual and reflective 
capacities for epistemic and practical rationality.  
The performative dimension (cf. supra, section 4.6.2) pertains to the interpersonal and social 
practices, which rely on, and gain meaning from, the societal infrastructure within which these 
practices take place. I use the notion of societal infrastructure as an umbrella term, to include 
the set of cognitive, conceptual, and organizational tools—the paradigm case being language, 
up to the social constructions/categories, beliefs and attitudes constituting a culture—, various 
coordination devices (i.e., conventions, rules, institutions), and collective epistemic resources 
making up the social world.  
Distinguishing these three dimensions helps provide a better articulation of the scope of a 
theory of agency, the focus of which can be on:  
1.   agency as a capacity (agential capacities/powers), exercised by 
concrete agents, to which different constitutive norms (both non-
practice-based and socially-generated, along with the characterization 
thereof provided in chapter four) apply, depending on whether we 
(third-personally) consider them as 
a.   biological (autonomous) systems 
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b.   cognizers 
c.   social individuals 
d.   persons 
2.   agency as a social activity (a set of procedures, practices, institutions), 
actualized in the concrete actions performed (actual performances and 
reactions—either positive or negative—executed, what is done)  
3.   agency from within the embodied (first- and second-personal) agential 
standpoints 
My proposal brings the performative dimension of agency into the picture, to emphasize that 
intentional action is social action. A social action in the minimal sense proper of the 
performative dimension, is an action whose identification and attribution takes place within the 
context of a structured practice—even though not necessarily in an institutional context.  
My reconceptualization is therefore meant to inherit the Anscombean outward-looking 
approach to agency in the sense implied by the thesis that any intentional action is given ‘under 
a description,’ along with her specification of the interactive process of reaching the ‘relevant’ 
description emerging from the reiterative application of the Why?-question. The agent’s social 
and interpersonal environments provide not only the interactive conditions for individual self-
awareness and self-experience91 crucially involved in the exercise of agency itself, but also the 
very conceptual tools to frame one’s and others’ intentional actions ‘under a description.’92 
Dialogically, we learn the meaning that our actions ‘make’ in the public sphere. The 
performative dimension I am pointing to represents the meeting ground (Dotson, 2014, p. 92) 
where the authoring of intentional actions takes place.  
 
5.5 Towards an Interactionist View 
What constitutes a human agent? Korsgaard is right in pointing out that we are born as creatures 
with certain agential capacities, who cannot help but act. We are nearly always also born into 
a social world, a world populated by others. However, not all of those others are or should be 
                                                
 
91 On the relational and social nature of selfhood, agency, and autonomy analyzed from a feminist 
perspective, see the essays in Mackenzie & Stoljar (2000); for an overview, see Stoljar (2013). See also 
Gallagher (2014). For a (quite radical) challenge to the distinction between a minimal and an interpersonally 
constituted sense of self, and the proposal of a reframing of psychotic conditions such as schizophrenia in 
relational terms, see Ratcliffe (ms.). 
92 See Thompson, 2008 for a logical treatment of practical concepts that emphasizes the constitutive 
normative relation between intentional action, and human practices and forms of life. Thompson’s work 




considered equal from an agential point of view. Only those in our immediate surroundings are 
witness to our first actions, our first acts of agency and thus start to attribute it to us. 
Endowed with this minimal agency, we are immersed in interpersonal settings where 
attributions of actions and agency become ‘thicker.’ As our cognitive, psychological, and social 
skills gradually develop, we are recognized and begin to recognize ourselves as authors of 
intentional actions through participation in the normative practice and exchange of practical 
reasons. By mastering and exercising our agential capacities, as simultaneous reasoners and 
actors, we become able to engage in increasingly complex social practices and relationships, 
wherein we are more fully recognized for our developing complexity. 
Those closest to us, that is, those with a concern for our agency—such as parents, siblings, 
extended family and close friends—provide the heart of our interactions and thus function as 
the first primary recognizers of our agency. In this way, the simultaneous and interrelated 
process of becoming and being recognized as an agent happens primarily through what I have 
called selective intersubjective recognition. It is selective because we are not recognized as 
agents by all of society, but by a select social group concerned with our agency who recognizes 
the intentions with which we are authoring our actions. 
Identifying the same capacity in our select group allows us to mutually reciprocate our 
authored agency, recognizing their agency as well. As our reciprocated agency flourishes, we 
are able to then recognize and interact with our agency on a macro level—taking note of our 
attributed place in broader social groupings beyond the selective group from which we 
developed. Of course we are always only more or less aware of these macro structures. 
Sometimes they completely highjack our intentions while other times we have the ability to 
negotiate them. Nevertheless, being recognized and interacting with our select intersubjective 
groups, while acknowledging our and their places in a broader social context, could be 
considered the paradigm agency of responsible and free individuals.  
Importantly, a paradigm agent is not an ideal agent. Developing and exercising agency is a 
complex and progressive process, and the trajectory of developing from a minimal into a 
paradigm agent is neither linear nor fixed. Full adults gain and lose ‘components’ of what 
makes a paradigm agent all the time, which is why, ontogenetically speaking, human agency 
is best captured by a model employing scalar notions through and through.  
Finally, the criteria for potential agents to be recognized and feel as such should not be 
thought of as hard-and-fast. This is not just because individual agents are constituted with 
others through selective intersubjective recognition, and therefore the criteria might vary across 




because the criteria themselves are subject to a certain extent of intersubjective negotiation and 
renegotiation in the broader choreography of the social dialectic of agency.93  
On the whole, my aim in this work has been to expand beyond Korsgaard’s authorship view, 
and to highlight human agency’s constitutive dependence on selective intersubjective 
recognition on the one hand and extended social recognition on the other, providing the 
preliminary reconceptualization for the development of a constitutivist theory of agency in an 
interactionist key.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have spelled out three distinct components of a first-order constitutivist theory 
of agency: i) the necessity of a scalar approach, ii) relationality, and iii) context-sensitivity and 
situatedness. These components were inspired by Korsgaard’s indication that action and 
agency are graded notions, and by her practical account of responsibility as answerability. I 
strengthened these aspects into the suggestions of adopting a thoroughly scalar approach to 
agency, and of considering agency as inherently socially constituted through interpersonal and 
social practices.  
In line with the argument built throughout the preceding chapters, I proposed a two-pronged 
path to expand on Korsgaard’s account, and outlined a characterization of agency that 
centralizes interaction rather than individual psychology. First, I suggested that some aspects 
of G. E. M. Anscombe’s work—interpreted as an outward-looking and interactional/dialogical 
approach to intentional action—be incorporated in the reframed account. Second, I introduced 
the notion of intersubjective recognition as a necessary component for the characterization of 
the social constitution of agency.   
A reframing of the constitutivist theory along the suggested components is capable of 
accounting for cases of Disorders and Displacement as legitimate instances of agency, and 
provide just a first step towards a principled articulation of what dysfunctional interactional 
dynamics consist of, and how the burden of agential and moral responsibility distributes when 
they occur.  
  
                                                
 
93 On the ‘social dialectic of agency,’ cf. Hegelian theories of action and practical reason—notably, the 




Chapter Six – Conclusions 
 
In this concluding chapter I recapitulate the trajectory of my argument throughout this work, 
articulate both its theoretical and practical implications, and discuss some of the limitations of 
my proposal and prospects for future research.  
 
6.1 Summary 
The main goal of this dissertation has been to provide a critique of, and an extension upon 
Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory of agency.  
To do so, I started chapter one with some definitions of the key notions in the philosophy of 
action. There, I also provided an outline of constitutivism’s origins and goals in relation to the 
metaethical and action-theoretical debates, as well as a first characterization of Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism in the context of this broader theoretical landscape. With the preliminaries in 
place, I stated the scope of my analysis and the aim of this work. Unlike much of the burgeoning 
literature engaging with Korsgaard’s work that addresses the metanormative ambitions of her 
argument, my interest has been in her first-order metaphysical-cum-normative account of 
agency. It is at this stage, especially with her thesis about the double nature of constitutive 
norms of agency, that the crucial normative step in the argument is made, which carries 
important consequences for what, metaphysically and practically, we are to consider as 
legitimate instances of agency and who we are to consider genuine agents. Consequently, 
throughout the critical part of the dissertation I pursued a clarification of the role played by 
constitutive norms in Korsgaard’s account, and of the status of the practical normativity 
pertaining to agency.  
Chapter two was dedicated to an extensive reconstruction of Korsgaard’s first-order 
constitutivist theory of agency. This was conducted by zeroing in on her version of the 
authorship view of action, the metaphysics of agency and normativity underpinning the thesis 
that self-constitution is the function of action and that agency is an activity of self-constitution, 
and her relational account of responsibility as answerability. The focus of Korsgaard’s 
authorship view is on the psychological structure necessary for an individual to own her action, 
which grants the characteristic relation of authority making those actions attributable to her as 
a whole, rather than to some desires or forces “working in or on her.” In short, according to 
Korsgaard, genuine actions—i.e., actions that fully constitute the agent as such—are 




capacity for normative self-government. In this way, being an agent amounts to being engaged 
in the activity of self-constitution, and the constitutive principle defining and governing such 
activity is the categorical imperative. I also outlined Korsgaard’s relational approach to 
responsibility and the (minimal) social dimension of agency and practical reasoning implied 
by her account of the normativity of reasons, supported by her arguments from the publicity of 
reasons and their essentially shareable character.   
In chapter three, I addressed what in the literature is known as the problem of defective 
actions. Despite Korsgaard’s explicit acknowledgement that the concepts of action and agency 
come in degree, one problematic consequence of her account is the tension between the 
simultaneously descriptive (‘norms for being’) and normative (‘norms for action’) character of 
constitutive norms. Given the relation of self-constitution between an agent and her actions, 
defective actions—i.e., less than autonomous actions—would somehow ‘transmit’ a kind of 
‘failure’ to the agent and render her ineffective qua agent.  
To explicate the problem, I made use of two case studies illustrating instances of ‘disorders 
of agency,’ and ‘socially displaced agency.’ A key point in the Disorders scenario, was the 
presumption for the effective ‘treatment’ of people with disorders of agency: no matter how 
developed their agential capacities are, they would be held accountable for their actions (i.e., 
judged blameworthy for them and asked to deal with their consequences), but not morally 
blamed for them. By undertaking this stance of responsibility without blame—which is, 
importantly, different from Strawson’s objective stance—trained practitioners of mental health 
services create a therapeutic relation and a space where patients can effectively develop and 
exercise their agential capacities. In light of the Disorders scenario, I argued against 
Korsgaard’s assimilation of the practical normativity of agency to moral normativity, and 
advanced the morally neutral notion of agential responsibility predicated upon Hanna 
Pickard’s articulation of responsibility without blame. The discussion of the Displacement 
scenario shed light on the phenomenon of the ‘social authoring’ of an action—the attribution 
of intentional action to others based on societal power structures. Acknowledging the power of 
social authoring led to the observation that while factors external to the agent—such as 
membership to disenfranchised groups subject to structures of oppression and violence—might 
have a distorting influence on their capacity to act as they intend, their agency is not thereby 
erased nor disabled. 
Overall, the analysis of both cases corroborated the relational approach of Korsgaard’s 
account of responsibility, which motivated my preliminary proposal to complement her 




function of the agent’s location within a network of social and interpersonal relationships, as 
well as of the quality of those relationships, as perceived by the agent herself.  
Chapter four refined the problem of defective actions by providing a conceptual elucidation 
of the notion of constitutive normativity, which is central to constitutivism as a first-order 
theory of agency. I presented three possible interpretations of Korsgaard’s characterization of 
the notion of constitutive norms—the Metaphysical Interpretation, the Individual Psychology 
Interpretation, and the Practical Interpretation. I discarded the Metaphysical Interpretation as 
unstable, and pointed out that an interpretation of constitutive norms of agency along the 
Individual Psychology Interpretation is partial. Consequently, I indicated the Practical 
Interpretation as the best way to make sense of the notion while accounting for the conclusions 
drawn in chapter three and preserving some of the insights of the Individual Psychology 
Interpretation. My conclusion was that the constitutive normativity pertaining to human agency 
is not homogeneous in kind, having both natural and social roots, and that while social 
conditions are necessary for agency, they are not sufficient. I therefore distinguished between 
a non-practice-based and a socially-generated variety of constitutive normativity, inspired by 
the theoretical framework on the metaphysics of normativity developed by the Autonomous 
System Account (ASA) of functional normativity, and by the Speech Act Theory (SAT), 
respectively.   
In chapter five, I outlined my view of an interactionist approach to agency by indicating 
three central components that a first-order constitutivist theory of agency should account for: 
i) the necessity of a scalar approach, ii) relationality, and iii) context sensitivity and 
situatedness. Inspired by Korsgaard’s acknowledgement that agency comes in degrees and by 
her practical account of responsibility, these aspects are considerably strengthened in my 
relational definition of what it is to be an agent (introduced in chapter three as the Agential 
Responsibility Claim), on the one hand, and the proposal of considering agency as inherently 
socially constituted through interpersonal and social practices (Interaction Claim), on the other. 
Relationality and the necessity of a scalar approach were accounted for in my Agential 
Responsibility Claim, stating that treating someone as an agent is to recognize and treat her as 
a legitimate participant in practices of accountability, which presupposes that she has, to some 
degree, certain agential capacities (i.e., knowledge of what she is doing, ability to exercise 
choice and a degree of control over her behavior). The Interaction Claim (introduced in chapter 
three) accounted for the inherent context-sensitivity and situatedness of agency, while 
receiving further refinement in my claim that (selective) intersubjective recognition is a 




In the simplest terms possible, my view of agency switches the emphasis from individual 
psychology to social interaction. Whereas Korsgaard prioritizes individual psychological unity, 
I consider social interaction necessary for individual psychological unity itself, thereby 
privileging its place in the constitutivist account. Nevertheless, while necessary, social 
interaction is not sufficient for ‘paradigm agency,’ which importantly involves an individual’s 
capacities for practical reasoning and deliberation, a certain amount of self-possession (self-
regulation and control), and the ability to discern the sense one’s actions make in the relevant 
interactive and social environments—all of which, of course, is a matter of degree needs case-
by-case contextualization. 
The peculiarity of my reframing of Korsgaard’s account lies in my proposal to incorporate 
aspects of G. E. M. Anscombe’s seminal work on intention—interpreted as an outward-looking 
and interactional/dialogical approach—which can be used to help explicate how constitutive 
features of agency, such as relationality and context-sensitivity, relate to the notions of a first-
personal agential standpoint and agential authority, expanding the scope of the explanation 
beyond the agent’s individual psychology.  
Anscombe’s account also helps us flesh out some of the scalar aspects of first-person and 
attributed intentionality, opening the way to understanding intentional actions, along with 
actions of cognate species such as merely voluntary actions and actions done for reasons, as 
structured on a spectrum of increasingly complex cognitive capacities and degrees of 
availability to the agent’s conscious control.  
Overall, the proposed reframing and expansion of Korsgaard’s first-order constitutivist 
account of agency helps us make better sense of cases such as Disorders and Displacement as 
legitimate instances of agency, and represents a first step towards a constitutivist-interactionist 
view which highlights agency’s inherent dependence on interpersonal and social recognition.  
 
6.2 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Beyond the specific goal of providing an expansion of Korsgaard’s constitutivist account, the 
present work also contributes to the general debate on constitutivism in a few distinct ways. 
From the point of view of its metanormative ambitions, this dissertation promotes a shift in 
focus from constitutivism’s hitherto strictly metaethical agenda to the broader project of an 
elucidation of how different kinds of normativity—i.e., norms of different provenance, such as 
biological, cognitive, social—hold together in the complex processes of the social constitution 




On the first-order metaphysical account of agency, my aim has been to contribute to the 
debate by illuminating potential points of connection with theories of collective intentionality, 
on the one hand, and of social ontology, on the other. To do so, I introduced the notion of 
intersubjective recognition and argued for its pervasive role in the development and exercise 
of individual agency. While there is recent valuable work in the philosophy of action and 
agency that takes the notion into account,94 this is the first attempt, to my knowledge, to 
incorporate it into a constitutivist theory of agency.  
The proposed relational characterization of what it is to be an agent (via the notions of 
agential responsibility and of intersubjective recognition), and the preliminary work done 
throughout the dissertation in the direction of an interactionist, context-sensitive, and situated 
view of agency are also first steps towards an exploration of the systemic character of 
responsibility. In doing so, I join others95 in investigating a conceptual and methodological 
reorientation towards less individualistic approaches in the philosophy of agency and action. 
Even though this dissertation has explicitly set aside the metanormative and ethical aspects 
of constitutivism, the conceptual clarifications pursued throughout have practical implications 
of markedly ethical significance. This work has been written on the understanding that 
theoretical work and categorization are normative practices with concrete practical effects. 
These effects manifest in domains other than philosophy, such as psychology, social work, and 
politics, and, more generally and fundamentally, in the collective narratives, attitudes, and 
practices (ordinary or otherwise) permeated by the language of agency and responsibility.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Prospects for Future Work 
While I have limited the scope of the present work to the notion of agency, a reframing towards 
a full constitutivist theory would require at least a tripartite investigation that also examines 
and connects the complementary and interrelated notions of action and practical reasoning.  
A second limitation of this work pertains to the selection of the cases in chapter three. There, 
the two cases I chose for the illustration of my points might be considered ‘extraordinary’ 
compared to more ordinary cases of failures or defects of agency (typically, cases of weakness 
                                                
 
94 In particular, see Arruda (2016b) for both a detailed state of the play on the issue of recognition in 
philosophy of action, and an original proposal on what the notion consists in.  
95 See Cash (2010), Hurley (2011), and Thalos & Andreou (2009), which draw on the hypothesis of Extended 
and Embodied Cognition in the philosophy of mind, bounded/situated approaches to rationality and practical 




of will, or bad actions), and Korsgaard might object that they are beyond the scope of what her 
theory avowedly tries to account for—i.e., the rational agency of adult human beings (SC, 
section 5.3). However, aim of my argument has been to emphasize how the continuity between 
these and more ‘ordinary’ cases (of successful and defective agency alike) points to the 
necessity of adopting a thoroughly scalar approach to agency, specifically, one in which the 
relationality, context-sensitivity, and situatedness are integral to what constitutes agency, 
besides the agential capacities of the individual agent. Besides helping to make my 
contributions clear-cut, the inclusion of those cases into my proposed reframing of Korsgaard’s 
theory allowed me to articulate the centrality of her notion of responsibility as a practical 
relation also to the constitution of agency, leading to an expanded theory capable of more 
enriching insights. In short, though Korsgaard might object they are beyond the scope of her 
theory, I argue her theory would be enriched if she included them. I agree, however, that 
investigating cases of ‘less extraordinary’ defective agency, considered within the relevant 
contexts, are also likely to produce further valuable insights leading to a further development 
of the proposals and insights outlined here. 
My approach in this work has also been limited to the constitutive (and causally non-
reductionist) perspective, which to be sure, is not the only perspective from which interesting 
and viable theories of agency are developed.  Interesting departure points for comparison with 
the ideas presented here might come from, among others, David Velleman’s and Michael 
Bratman’s theories which developed different frameworks that must nonetheless address the 
same or similar issues.  
In terms of expansion, given my commitment to provide an outward-looking account of 
agency and intentional action, I welcome the opportunity of further exploring the fitting of an 
Anscombean approach to intentionality into a full-fledged theory of agency. ‘Going 
Anscombean’ represents an extremely intriguing direction of development for some of the 
points outlined in this work, which would contribute to a burgeoning scholarship in practical 
philosophy, with important ramifications in other areas of philosophy as well, notably 
epistemology. In particular, I see great potential in elaborating on Anscombe’s characterization 
of intentional action in terms of practical knowledge in the direction of an epistemology of 
competence, or knowledge-how, and other forms of practical knowledge.   
Finally, among the points indicated as practical implications of this work, it would be 
valuable to a number of communities to bring its ethical aspects to full development—possibly 




theoretical framework in the service of mental health care research, practice, and policy 
making, and other forms of social policies. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The motivation for this work stems from the experience of moments and situations of 
disempowered agency—online, in the news, and while traversing the public sphere. These 
situations allowed the observation that agency seldom, if ever, disappears; that complicated 
moments of agency come and go; that anyone (to different extents and degrees of severity) is 
vulnerable to them. Constituting agency is in our power together, for better or worse, and we 
need to own responsibility for our ability and possibility to empower (or disempower) each 
other.  
Providing theoretical legitimacy to agents and agency distant from the paradigm cases is 
therefore in itself an act of practical recognition, validation, and advocacy. As such, this work 
is meant to be one small step in the greater fight against stigmatization of people with mental 
health conditions, racial discrimination, and other forms of thwarting and disempowering of 
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